Logical problem

• The logical problem of evil is a deductive argument that says the existence of God is logically impossible given the existence of evil in the world.
• Moral evil:


  Evil acts committed by people, like murder or torture.
• Natural evil


  Suffering as a result of natural processes, like volcanic eruptions or earthquakes.
• The inconsistent triad:

  Mackie's argument is that the following statements are logically inconsistent:

  1. God is omnipotent
  2. God is omnibenevolent
  3. Evil exists
• J.L Mackie: Evil & omnipotence:

  He argues that if God is omnibenevolent then he wants to stop evil. And if God is omnipotent, then he’s powerful enough to prevent evil. But evil does exist in the world, so either God isn’t powerful enough to stop evil, doesn’t want to stop evil, or both.

  God is defined as an omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. If such a being existed, then evil would not exist. But evil does exist. Therefore, there is no omnipotent and omnibenevolent being. Therefore, God does not exist.
• Good couldn't exist without evil: response to the inconsistent triad:

  People often make claims like 'you can’t appreciate the good times without experiencing some bad times'. Mackie responds to this by saying God could have created a world in which there was no evil. We wouldn’t have the concept of evil, but it would still be the case that everything is good – we just wouldn’t be aware of it.
• The world is better with some evil than none at all: response to the inconsistent triad:

  Some evil is necessary for certain types of good, you couldn't be courageous (good) without overcoming the fear of death (evil). Second order goods (courage) seek to maximise first order goods (pleasure). And second order goods are more valuable than first order goods. But without first order evils, second order goods couldn’t exist.
• Mackie would say that second order evils (e.g cruelty) seek to maximise first order evils such as pain, we could still have a world in which people were courageous (second order good) in overcoming pain (first order evil) without these second order evils. So why would an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God allow the existence of second order evils if there is no greater good in doing so?
• We need evil for free will: response to the inconsistent triad:

  Free will is inherently such a good and valuable thing that it outweighs the bad that results from people abusing free will to do evil things. While allowing free will brings some suffering, the net good of having free will is greater than if we didn’t. Therefore, it’s logically possible that an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God would allow evil (both first order and second order) for the greater good of free will.
• Mackie's response to the argument of needing evil for free will:

  • An omnipotent God can create any logically possible world.
  • If it’s logically possible to freely choose to act in a way that’s good on one occasion, then it’s logically possible to freely choose to act in a way that’s good on every occasion.
  • So, an omnipotent God could create a world in which everyone freely chooses to act in a way that’s good.
• What is the main argument of Plantinga's free will defense regarding the problem of evil?

  God may allow second order evil for the greater good of free will.
• How does Plantinga define a morally significant action?

  A morally significant action is one that is either morally good or morally bad.
• What characterizes a being that is significantly free?

  A being that is significantly free can do or not do morally significant actions.
• Why would a being created by God to only do morally good actions not be considered significantly free?

  Because it would lack the ability to choose between good and bad actions.
• What would be the consequence of God eliminating evil according to Plantinga's argument?

  God would have to eliminate significantly free beings to eliminate evil.
• How does Plantinga argue the value of a world with significantly free beings compared to one without?

  A world with significantly free beings is more good than a world without them.
• What is the distinction between first order and second order evil in Plantinga's argument?

  Second order evil refers to the moral choices that lead to first order evil.
• Perhaps God could have created the world where everyone chose to only do morally good actions (as Mackie describes) but such a world wouldn’t be significantly free. Free will is inherently good and so significant free will could outweigh the negative of people using that significant free will to commit second order evils.
• Natural evil as a form of moral evil: problem for the logical problem of evil

  Plantinga argues that it’s possible natural evil is the result of non-human actors such as Satan, fallen angels, demons, etc. This would make natural evil another form of moral evil, the existence of which would be explained by free will.

  Even if this doesn’t sound plausaible, it’s at least possible. And Plantinga’s argument is that we only need to show evil is not logically inconsistent with God’s existence to defeat the logical problem of evil.
• Soul making: problem for the logical problem of evil

  The Irenaean theodicy (what Hick calls soul-making) can also serve as a possible explanation of why God allows evil: We need evils in order to overcome them and freely develop spiritual virtues.