UN involvement

Cards (7)

  • UN was unable to prevent it as nobody would listen to them.
    Israel believed that the UN were sympathetic toward Palestine and turned to the USA for support.
    • Arab states turned to the USSR for support.
  • Resolution 338 - passed on 22 October 1973 - called for peace:
    • Sadat agreed to call a ceasefire, Israelis ignored.
    Resolution 340 - passed (demanding ceasefire)
    • USSR threatening to send troops to help Egypt, Arab states stopped selling oil to USA.
  • USA put pressure on Israel to agree to ceasefire and this worked.
    • Henry Kissinger who was the Secretary of State in USA was sent out to negotiate.
    • Resolution 340 was established and UNEF 2 were also established to oversee disengagement and supervise a buffer zone
  • UN disengagement observation force supervised Israel + Syria.
    Kissinger oversaw 'disengagement agreements' in 1974.
    • prisoners of war to be exchanged
  • Negative for UN
    • Resolution 242 did not prevent the Yom Kippur war
    • UN Resolution 338, calling for an end to the Yom Kippur war on 22 October 1973 was ineffective and fighting continued
    • Israel increasingly ignored the UN after the Yom Kippur war, especially after the UN voted to accept the Palestinians' right to self-determination in November 1974
  • Positive for the UN
    • UN Resolution 340 calling for an end to the Yom Kippur war on 25 October 1973, did help the fighting to end
    • Resolution 340 established a second emergency force, UNEF 2 in October 1973. It played an important role in supervising and monitoring disengagement agreements of 1974
    • During UNEF 2's 6 year development there was no further war between Israel and its Arab neighbours.
  • It was not actually UN forces which ultimately stopped the fighting, it was US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who negotiated the deals and ended the fighting on 25 October 1973. This proved to be a weakness for the UN as they were unable to stop it themselves.