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• 1. If resource values increase, institutional entrepreneurs will respond by devoting more effort to creating, rearranging, and redistributing property rights and vice versa.
• 2. If technological change lowers the cost of defining and enforcing property rights, more effort will be devoted to the definition and enforcement
• 3. if technological changes alter the way in which goods are produced, new contractual arrangements will evolve to organize production and measure and monitor input use
• 4. If resources are mobile over large territories, if the production process requires control of large areas, or if there are scale economies in the use of force, the size of the collective will be larger
• 5. because each member of a small collective unit has a greater stake in the residual rents (that is, rent remaining after transaction costs are subtracted), smaller units are more likely to reduce transaction cost, while larger units are more likely to increase them
• 6. larger collective units are more likely to create differential advantages in the use of force and hence are more likely to be used for redistributing rights
• 7. because agency costs increase with the size of the collective, with heterogeneity of members, and with difficulty of exiting from the collective, larger collective units are more likely to engage in the redistribution of rights