Hannibalic-Italian diplomacy was key to the long-term development and reinforcement of Roman power in Italy.
Roman envoys described the early relations between Rome and Carthage as early as 218BC, but it’s unlikely this was a formal alliance as it was a dedito in fidem which had obvious power imbalances.
The Romans were intimidated by Carthaginian power, particularly as they gained land throughout Libya and Spain.
If the Carthaginians gained Sicily, they would be a genuine threat to Rome.
The First Punic War (264 BC – 241 B) saw Carthage and Rome always having good relations, each staying out of their sphere of influence.
The 241 Campaign against Falerii resulted in the death of 15,000 Faliscans, serving as a powerful example of resistance to Roman hegemony and assertion of autonomy by a state situated close to Rome rather than at the fringes of the peninsula.
The Romans felt obliged to the Mamertines for their active role in the war that confirmed Roman control over Southern Italy against the Tarentines.
The Mamertines made a dedito in fidem to Rome and asked Rome to protect them as a provincia.
The Invasion of Sicily in 264BC saw the Syracusans forced to surrender to Rome after King Hieron made a treaty with Carthage to stop Roman movement South.
Appius Claudius, the consul, took advantage of weak military planning by the Carthaginian-Syracusan alliance, attacking the two individually, causing the army great hardship but crushing the Syracusans.
Later 60 cities dedito in fidem to Rome and the Syracusans surrendered.
The Philinus Treaty, as recorded by Polybius, stated that the Romans were obligated to stay away from the whole of Sicily and the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy.
Rome’s decision to cross into Sicily would have breached the Philinus Treaty.
After Campania was lost to Hannibal, the everyday Romans grew disillusioned with war.
The division of provinciae between the consuls made a two-front war plausible and actually worked in their favour as the enemy could rarely match it.
Hannibal was forced to renegotiate the peace agreement, offering Sicily, Sardinia, Spain and islands between Italy and Africa.
Carthage arguably had superior Calvary.
The speed of Hannibal’s army forced a change in Scipio’s plan of operations, as he tried to make his way back from Spain, facing large losses on the way.
The Scipios had a long history of involvement in Africa, allying with Syphax, King of the Masaeyli, who had revolted against Carthage.
The Roman Army in 216BC had 80,000 men across 20 legions in the consular armies of L Aemilius Paullus and C Terentius Varro.
Scipio wanted the weakening of Carthage.
Towards the end of the Second Punic War, the rivalry and competition for and within the consulship grew rapidly, with people expecting victory as part and parcel of being a consul.
In 215, the Scipios had to find the money to pay their troops by levies on Spanish peoples.
Rome didn't commission any new ships during the Second Punic War due to a lack of confidence in their ability to defeat Rome at sea.
After the Battle of Zama, Carthage was indemnified 10,000 talents.
Scipio did not want a rapid conclusion to the war but wanted to take advantage of every benefit his position gave him.
Cornelius Scipio, who was in charge of the African campaign, did whatever he could to conclude the war under his own imperium in order to harvest the glory of victory over Hannibal.
The Peace Agreement was abandoned due to a Carthaginian attack on Roman supply ships.
M Claudius Marcellus suffered 3 defeats in a row, with the third ending in the loss of his life.
In terms of military strength and population, Carthage reached a peak in 212 of 240,000.
Massinissa also changed sides in 206 but didn't openly proclaim defection from Carthage.
Hannibal was forced to convince the Carthaginians to take up the deal.
Cn Manlius Vulso’s sordid campaign against the Galatians in 189 provided evidence that wars were started for the ending glory.
His use of liberation propaganda also contributes to this idea.
Carthaginian accounts have been lost entirely.
Polybius’ account of these events seem to stem back to Fabius Pictor who was mainly concerned with justifying senatorial policy.
Post-Pyrrhic War, most of our sources expand away from Italy and into the Mediterranean.
The process of urbanisation/centralisation did increase conflict as people fought for limited resources.
Philinius of Acragas’ work was used by Polybius but was so intertwined with his words that we cannot truly distinguish whose is whose.
Elites were encouraged to conquer neighbouring cities instead of protecting their own land.