3.

• 1969 Biko formed South African Students’ Association as part of the Black Consciousness movement.
• Black Consciousness was tolerated by the government at first because they felt its emphasis on separate development might tie in with apartheid. Goals included:

  • non-cooperation with white groups, even those sympathetic to the ending of apartheid
  • encouraging Indians and coloureds to see themselves as black and equally subject to white opposition
• Government soon turned against SASO because of its activities:

  • 1972 organised strikes on university campuses about inferior facilities
  • 1974 celebrated the overthrow of Portuguese colonial regimes in Mozambique and Angola (clearly seeing the struggle against apartheid in the same terms)

  SASO banned in 1975, however it continued as an underground organisation.
• Black Consciousness movement had targeted children before, in 1973 strikes. School students were increasingly frustrated by lack of educational opportunities and an increasing awareness that the purpose of school was largely to keep them in servitude. → uprising in Soweto
• Soweto - one of the biggest townships, problems of overcrowding, squalor and crime. Problems were exacerbated by government’s cutting subsidies on maize and corn at a time of economic downturn.

  Soweto saw creation of SASM (South African Students Movement) to campaign specifically against poor-quality education - organised the Soweto protests.
• SOWETO UPRISING:

  Massive demonstration against medium of Afrikaans in teaching in June 1976. Thousands of children took part, protests spread to other areas in the Transvaal, Natal and the Cape. 

  • Short-term cause: children resented being taught in the language of their oppressors, in which many were not fluent.
  • Long-term factors: conditions in overcrowded townships, conditions specifically schools, absence of recognised leaders who could possibly have organised their frustrations.
• Following outbreak in Soweto, the uprising continued throughout South Africa. Children went on strike, schools were burnt down. The demonstrations and protest were the biggest seen so far.
• Authorities were surprised by strength of initial demonstrations in Soweto. Responded with the usual brutality - police began to fire on the children, killing up to 20. The world was shocked by a photo showing the corpse of 13 year old Hector Peterson. 

  • Minister of Justice (Jimmy Kruger) blamed the demonstrators for fomenting trouble. Government officials accused them of seeking communist revolution while the official line remained that as the government provided resources for African education it had the right to choose the form it would take.
• soweto uprising response: Security forces may have killed as many as 1000 as a result of the protests. Banning orders, imprisonment and the suppression of 18 organisations followed.
• (Soweto) As the demonstrations continued it became clear that no central organisation was directing them. Most were localised, spontaneous and organised by school children themselves - new feature in protest, more dangerous because of its unpredictability. 
• Mysterious death of Biko had great significance - not just that Biko was victim of police brutality (ANC rcorded 14 deaths in police custody 1977 alone), but because he was widely known and respected abroad. His death in such horrific circumstances shocked many in South Africa and all over the world:

  • UN and USA protested over his death
  • widespread worldwide condemnation - subject of a very popular movie ‘Cry Freedom’ in the following decade which led to even more international condemnation of apartheid
  • authorities remained impassive
• Soweto uprising and death of Biko marked the end of a point at which many people considered the possibility of any peaceful solution to the problems of apartheid. It seemed a battle between an intractable and determined government and increasingly militant opponents of apartheid.
• decline of ANC in early 1970s:

  • Former leaders were still in prison, organisation itself was in exile. 
  • Many distrusted the integrationist policies and were more prepared to see all whites as enemies.
  • ANC hadn’t been involved in a military campaign since the unsuccessful Wankie uprising in 1967. 
• Under leadership of Oliver Tambo, the ANC was planning for a new phase of struggle. It was reorganised abroad to co-ordinate activities:

  • to oversee the growing number of exiles
  • raise funds
  • set up ANC offices throughout the world
  • co-ordinate the activities of MK

  ANC had headquarters in London where its strategies for gaining international support were co-ordinated. Maintained bases in friendly African countries from where it could launch raids into South Africa.
• 1978 - ANC leaders visited Vietnam to study (what it saw as) its victory over the USA and success in uniting the country. As a result, ANC changed tactics from attacks in rural areas to guerilla warfare in urban areas, which it felt would attract more publicity. 
• Biggest task for the ANC was to make itself the clear leader of the opposition against apartheid. To do this it needed to win international legitimacy, to be seen effectively as a government in exile rather than a terrorist group. 
• ANC spent much of the 1970s winning external legitimacy, both in Africa and in the wider world.

  • ANC leaders (Tambo) visited countries to try to win support and legitimacy. They were disadvantaged by being seen by many as pro-communist, particularly within the context of the Cold War, and having support from communist regimes.
  • Many groups and individuals in Western countries disliked the ANC stance on violence, typically asking them to stop the armed struggle - right-wing observers in Britain and the USA often regarded the ANC as a terrorist organisation -- limited their overall support.
• 1963 - OAU (Organisation of African Unity) had been set up to encourage the newly independent African states to co-operate together - its Liberation Committee set up camps for ANC recruits and provided military training and equipment. However African regimes weren’t strong enough to give more substantial support to the ANC - most traded with South Africa and some were dependent on it (Zambia reliant on South African railways and ports to export the copper which comprised 95% of its income). South Africa put pressure on regimes to expel the ANC, for example on Tanzania in 1969.
• Tambo effectively became the international ‘face’ of the ANC, its global ambassador.

  Tambo developed the strategy of military conflict and the development of a mass political organisation, but progress was slow. However he did keep the organisation intact and provided a unifying figure.
• Tambo saw the need to build up international support and counter the accusations emanating from South Africa about the ANC’s relationship with communism. To end this he would meet regularly with influential figures to explain the ANC position and assure where necessary that the ANC supported capitalist development - met with representatives of US multinational companies in the early 1980s in the face of Reagan’s aggressive stance against communism.
• One of Tambo’s biggest challenges was to keep the ANC unified while appealing to foreign supporters and reassuring whites that they would have nothing to fear from an ANC victory. In the face of President Botha’s 1985 state of emergency, he advocated for making the country ungovernable through military and non-cooperative actions. 

  October 1985 he gave evidence to a British House of Commons committee which led to a British delegation being sent to South Africa to investigate the state of apartheid - their report was critical and supported sanctions.
• ANC had begun to infiltrate guerilla fighters into South Africa from the early 1970s. However the ANC was never strong enough militarily to threaten the apartheid regime, although the persistence of conflict could weaken it alongside other factors, and did lead to a huge military commitment which drained the economy.
• MK attacks from the mid-1970s included sabotage of railways and industrial plants, attacks on government offices and assassinations. Their strength was in their persistence rather than large-scale effect.
• ANC and other anti-apartheid movements gained considerable encouragement from the global anti-apartheid movement which covered many countries where people organised rallies and public events to show their opposition to the regime.

  Governments themselves were often lukewarm, reluctant to offend South Africa and wary of the ANC ties with communism and its military activities.
• anti-apartheid movement in Britain in the 1960s promoted sanctions and boycotts. There was encouragement from organisations in Holland and Canada. Popular support in the USA led Congress to impose sanctions in October 1986, overriding Reagan’s veto.
• As the 1970s progressed the National Party faced more political challenges. There were conflicting responses as society changed and South Africa became more aware of the wider world.

  • Growth in liberalism, particularly among young, manifested itself in the growth of the Progressive Party - advocated a federal structure for a non-racial South Africa. However with 17 seats in 1977 as opposed to the National Party’s 134, its impact was limited.
  • Other whites became more entrenched, opposing any reform.
• Bantustans continued to fail during 1970s, 4 granted independence but none recognised by any country other than South Africa. All were dependent on South Africa for subsidies, couldn’t support their official populations. 
• As the 1970s progressed, the problems facing the National Party were compounded by scandals and economic challenges. By the end of the decade, the military commitment was becoming unsustainable.
• It seemed that having successfully emerged from the Soweto uprising and death in custory of Steve Biko, the biggest threats to the National Party came from within its own ranks.

  Muldergate scandal - large sums of money were discovered to have been syphoned off to pay for propaganda purposes (bribes distrubuted to places like USA and Britain to promote the regime).

  Scandal focused around Minister of Information Connie Mulder, who was associated with senior government figures, threatening the position of government. A report in 1978 discovered Vorster’s involvement, forcing him to resign. 
• South Africa faced increasing economic pressures. Costs of maintaining and subsidising the Bantustans were costly, as well as expense of defence, meant the economy was struggling.

  Like most countries, suffered from huge increases in oil prices as a result of the 1973 oil crisis.
• South African Defence Force (SADF) had doubled in size between 1960-65, and continued to grow as its foreign commitments became more complex and widespread.

  Military commitments grew as South Africa’s neighbours won their independence and turned from allies into hostility. By 1977 military spending peaked at 5% of GDP, with forces being deployed both externally and internally as a result of the Soweto uprising.
• Efforts by neighbouring countries to reduce their dependence on South Africa failed.

  Longer-established states in Southern Africa may have protested apartheid but maintained ties South Africa through economic necessity. Zambia and Malawi (+ Botswana, Swaziland) relied on South Africa for trade and access to ports. South Africa controlled oil and electricity supplies to neighbouring countries and employed their surplus workers. 
• South Africa was condemned internationally since the National Party victory of 1948. After Sharpeville and the decolonisation process in Africa, protest grew dramatically. The regime did little to alleviate this condemnation through its non-compromise policies.
• The call for economic sanctions was widespread. 

  • The British anti-apartheid movement originally focused on economic boycotts - calling for a month-long boycott of South African goods in March 1960, and for an international committee on sanctions to be held in April 1964. 
  • The UN had passed Resolution 1761 in November 1962 - setting up a special committee against apartheid and calling for economic sanctions.

  However many Western countries refused to join this committee. UN called for an oil embargo as early as 1960 but this wasn’t mandatory.
• Western countries saw South Africa as a useful ally in the global struggle against communism. Governments also argued the regime might be more susceptible to reform if it remained part of the international community - if isolated it might become even more intransigent.

  Leaders argued that sanctions would hurt the African population the most as they were the poorest group.
• UN had called for a voluntary arms embargo as early as 1963 but this didn’t become mandatory until 1977 with Resolution 418 after widespread condemnation of the brutality with which the regime dealt with the Soweto uprising.
• Until the mid-1980s, economic sanctions had a limited economic imipact on South Africa, although they did add to the sense of hostility and isolation.

  Reasons for limited impact: Southern African countries needed to maintain trade links, countries could get round sanctions (Israel).
• During the 1980s, significant opposition to apartheid grew in the USA, particularly as the fear from the USSR and communism diminished. Congress overrode the president’s veto over sanctions → more companies withdrew investment. US banks (Chase Manhattan) began to refuse to renew loans, for example $10 million of short-term loans maturing in 1987, creating a severe financial crisis which led in part to the South African government beginning negotiations to end apartheid.

  One 1989 report estimated that economic sanctions had reduced the potential growth rate in South Africa by 10%.
• Cultural and sporting boycotts had begun in the 1960s with South Africa being suspended from the Olympic Games in 1964 and formally excluded in 1970. As a sporting nation, these boycotts were keenly felt. Commonwealth passed the Gleneagles Agreement in 1977 which forbade members to compete against South Africa.