US attitudes to Germany and Berlin

• Jan 1947 – the British and American occupation zones in Germany and Berlin were merged into a single zone (Bizonia)
• Reinforced the indication that the USA was interested in creating a clearly defined West German state
• This Western German state was to become a leading force in the unification of an economically stable and united Western European bloc
• Feb 1948 – new currency introduced to the Western zones of Germany and Berlin
• Formally activated in June and the consequences were immediate
• The Soviet Union imposed a blockade on Berlin
• MP marked a significant shift in US policy towards Germany and Berlin 
• Suggested that the USA recognised that a strong Germany economy was fundamental to the development of European economic recovery
• MP represented a new understanding of the importance of Germany, and Berlin, in the economic recovery of Western Europe as a whole 
• Germany = central part of USA’s relationship with Europe and fundamentally important role in the CW
• Nov 1947 – Zhdanov referred to the USA’s intention to construct a ‘Western Bloc’ with Germany at the centre ‘as an American protectorate’
• By June 1948 – London Conference reached the conclusion that Germany should have its own Constituent Assembly 
• US State Department said ‘the London agreements mark the first broad, constructive step toward the resolution of the German problem since Potsdam’
• Some US policy makers weren’t supportive of direct involvement in Germany 
• Kennan didn’t believe the MP would free the USA from a long-term dependency on it by the Western zone of Germany 
• By March 1947 – moves from USA to a more divided Germany became more obvious
• Moscow Council of Foreign Ministers broke up  - failed to reach any firm agreement on a final peace treaty with Germany 
• May – USA increased the responsibility of the Germans in Bizonia for their own economic development 
• By Sept 1947 – coal production made German responsibility
• Increasingly clear to US policy makers that a divided Germany rather than it become aligned with the USSR
• MP had closed down a range of policy options that may have been open to the USA
• There was a commitment for most US policy makers to reject the notion of a reunified Germany
• A reunified Germany might become too powerful through the manipulation of the Western and Eastern powers
• Germany might align itself with the USSR, particularly if the comm influence already present assumed greater force in a reunified Germany
• The extent of American influence could be undermined as Germany developed a degree of economic dominance that would ensure its independence 
• The development of a West German recovery, rather than a wide reunified Germany, would be more manageable and therefore ensure US influence in Europe as a whole more easily