early developments, 1958-60

• USA shown little significant support for the Batista regime during Castro’s revolution 
• USA was willing to let it run its course while it looked like a home-grown, nationalist, non-comm uprising with no direct external aid from comm states
• May 1958 – vice president Richard Nixon went on a goodwill visit to some Latin American states
• Led to a shift in US policy towards the region 
• Economic stability = target 
• USA supported the creation of a regional banking institution, the Inter-American Development Bank, and regional common markets
• DDE also agreed not to offer unconditional American support to dictators 
• Ordered an embargo on further arms shipments to Batista 
• Castro needed the support of a great power for the inevitable US response to his plans to reduce US economic and political influence in post-rev Cuba
• Had to maintain his own authority and Cuba’s independence whilst avoiding alienating powerful internal and external allies
• May 1959 – Castro introed a programme of agrarian reform
• Led to considerable amounts of American-owned property being seized by the state
• Early reforms were moderate rather than revolutionary – didn’t instantly generate a hostile US response 
• US fears of Cuba becoming a Soviet satellite in the Caribbean were heightened when Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba in February 1960
• He arranged $100 million in credits with Castro 
• Inevitably tied Cuba into an economic and political relationship with the USSR
• First shipment of crude oil from the USSR arrived in April 1960
• When US-owned oil companies refused to refine it, Castro nationalised them
• USA immediately imposed economic sanctions on Cuba and reduced their imports of Cuban sugar by 95%
• Deterioration of relations continued when Castro seized $1 billion worth of US assets on Cuba in Oct 1960
• Castro needed the USSR for both foreign and domestic reasons 
• By 1961 – the USA decided it was the time to remove Castro and his regime from Cuba