the significance of the crisis

• Brought the world closer to a nuclear war than had ever happened at any other time 
• Despite the critical nature of the crisis, there was little evidence to suggest that NK or JFK were taking irresponsible actions that could’ve led to a loss of control 
• Showed that international relations cannot be conducted through crisis management methods
• Quickly accepted that it was insufficient to see the crisis as the epitome of crisis management and a model, therefore, of how any future crises may be managed
• Immediate response was the creation, in 1963, of a ‘hot line’ connecting the Kremlin and the White House 
• Frequency of the hot line’s usage is unknown 
• Some historians have taken the view that its symbolic value has been greater than its practical application 
• Led to a growing awareness of the need to create some control over the nuclear arms race by placing restrictions on nuclear tests
• October 1963 – Moscow Test Ban Treaty or the ‘Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water’ came into force 
• NK first proposed nuclear test ban negotiations as early as 30 Oct 1962
• Treaty contained no provisions for underground tests or for periodic review and inspection 
• This implicit sanctioning of the testing of nuclear weapons underground encouraged weapon proliferation among the major nuclear powers 
• The signatories, after 3 months, could restart testing if they thought that their vital national interests were at stake by doing so 
• No obligation on states to sign up – China and France didn’t 
• They continued to test nuclear weapons in the atmosphere 
• Despite its many shortcomings, the treaty was a major contributing factor in the development of détente
• The CMC had seen the USA using its superior military power to pressure the Soviets to withdraw the missiles - humiliation for the USSR
• USA’s actions may be viewed as an offensive use of military power 
• The USSR had been forced to respond rather than being deterred from taking actions 
• The outcome had been a perceived CW defeat for the USSR and a constraint on Soviet freedom of action in the international arena 
• The USSR had strategic parity with the USA, and despite the moves towards détente and controls over nuclear testing, the USSR emerged from the crisis with a determination to restore its international status 
• At the end of the crisis, Cuba remained a comm state in the USA’s ‘back yard’ 
• The US commitment to containment and the Truman Doctrine had failed 
• This began to raise the issue of its validity by the 1960s, but no to the point where the crisis had fully undermined US CW policy in international relations 
• US intervention in SV was only just beginning to develop as the CMC came to an end 
• Cuba’s survival may be seen as a spectacular success for NK 
• The crisis proved to be more than a clash between the USA and the USSR
• It was part of a process of revolutionary change with developing countries 
• 1975 – Castro sent troops to Angola in support of that state’s revolutionary regime following the withdrawal of Portugal from Africa 
• Not only did the crisis ensure the survival of Cuba and its comm regime, it also ensured the survival of WB as an outpost of Western capitalist democracy in the heart of the comm bloc in EE
• Aspects of the dynamics of international relations and CW interactions had moved the bipolar world closer towards greater co-operation prior to the era of détente which was to follow