the USA's reaction to Afghanistan, 1978-79

• Events in A. were of greater significance when, in Iran, the Shah’s pro-American regime was overthrown by anti-American Islamic fundamentalists led by Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini
• Feared that his regime would collapse and leave Iran vulnerable to leftist or even comm influences
• Could further reinforce the USSR’s regional influence
• Soviet links with A. began to assume greater importance for the USA
• Summit meeting with Brezhnev – Pres. Carter highlighted the USA’s growing concerns
• Emphasised that the USA hadn’t interfered in the internal affairs of A. and didn’t expect the USSR to do so either
• Carter called it a flagrant breach of international protocol and significant threat to international peace
• Any possibility of early ratification of the SALT II agreements was impossible
• 3 Jan 1980 – Carter formally asked the US Senate to postpone indefinitely any further consideration of the SALT II agreement because of the Soviet invasion of A.
• 4 Jan 1980 – Carter addressed the nation and set out a series of measures aimed at the USSR
• A deferral of action on cultural and economic exchanges
• Major restrictions on Soviet fishing privileges in American waters
• A ban on the sale of high tech and strategic items to the Soviets
• An embargo on sales of grain to the USSR
• US military and economic assistance to Pakistan to enhance that state’s security
• 23 Jan 1980 – the president unveiled the so-called Carter Doctrine for the defence of the Persian Gulf
• Carter Doctrine = American commitment to prevent any further Soviet advance into the Persian Gulf area and SW Asia
• Emphasised the prospect of a military solution to any such expansionism and focused on building up US strategic forces
• Reinforced the need for the USA to strengthen its relations with China
• Also tried to persuade NATO and the West to suspend E-W détente
• But détente in Europe was working beneficially
• Europe deplored Soviet actions over A. but leaders weren’t prepared to suspend détente in Europe
• Europe’s trade links with the USSR not only continued but expanded
• Europe didn’t see its interests being served by allowing itself to become a pawn in the USA's global power strategy
• Carter announced an increase in the defence budget for 1981
• He linked America’s relations with the USSR and the future of détente to the USSR’s decision to maintain a military presence in A.
• Soviets would have to submit to America’s demand for their withdrawal
• Represented an ultimatum and shut down any possibility of a diplomatic solution
• Questions whether Soviet actions did threaten American’s vital interest in the Persian Gulf and whether the Carter Doctrine was a massive overreaction by the USA
• Soviets took the view that the USA leadership in 1980 had used the intervention in A. as a pretext that enabled them to dismantle détente, revive the nuclear arms race and build up a positive of strength for the USA in the Persian Gulf
• American actions not seen by the USSR as a response to their intervention
• Seen as a classic piece of international opportunism
• America was simply waiting for ‘an Afghanistan’ to happen to fulfil its real aim of bringing détente to an end
• Soviet invasion of A. was the final blow in détente’s existence
• West – invasion demanded international condemnation and a policy of containment to prevent further Soviet expansionism
• Invasion didn’t represent a threat to world peace greater than any since WW2 – view taken by the USA
• Carter administration = determined that its entire relations with the USSR depended on a Soviet withdrawal from A.
• Carter made a fundamental shift in Soviet-American relations
• USA moved away from the Nixon-Kissinger position of cooperation / management of Soviet power
• Reverted to a position of containment more associated with the Truman-Eisenhower-Kennedy approach