CS - Causation

Cards (13)

  • Malcharek & Steel (1981)

    Intervening acts - a decision by a doctor to switch off a life support machine when the victim is brain dead will not break the chain of causation.
  • Jordan (1956)

    Intervening acts - the chain of causation was broken when V was given a large amount of antibiotics he was allergic to and died as it was the overwhelming cause of death and the stab wound had virtually healed.
  • Cheshire (1991)

    Intervening acts - D shot V twice and 2 months later died due to rare complications from a bad tracheotomy. D was held liable for the death as his actions had contributed 'significantly' even though the injuries were no longer life-threatening.
  • Smith (1959)

    Intervening acts - medical treatment, even if negligent, is unlikely to break the chain of causation - After being stabbed by D, V was dropped twice and left untreated and although it contributed to the death they still found D guilty of murder as it was a substantial cause.
  • Kennedy No.2 (2007)

    Intervening acts - a free, voluntary and informed action by the victim can break the chain of causation - D supplied drugs to V who died after self-injecting.
  • Williams (1992)

    Intervening acts - V died after jumping from a moving car allegedly to avoid having his wallet stolen. This reaction was disproportionate to the threat so broke the chain of causation.
  • Roberts (1971)

    Intervening acts - V's reaction to jump from a moving car was reasonably foreseeable when D made sexual advances towards her. The chain of causation was not broken.
  • Blaue (1975)

    Thin skull rule - D was held responsible for V's death when the Jehovah's Witness he stabbed refused a blood transfusion, despite the fact that she would have survived if she had accepted the treatment.
  • Benge (1846)
    Legal causation - D failed to give adequate warning to an approaching train driver and a fatal accident occurred. D substantially caused the death through his negligence. It was irrelevant that the accident may have been avoided if others had not also been negligent.
  • Kimsey (1996)

    Legal causation - D and V engaged in a high speed car chase. V lost control of the car and died. D's driving did not have to be the substantial cause of death but the contribution must be more than minimal.
  • Hughes (2013)

    Demonstrates how factual causation is not necessarily enough to prove liability. D was charged with causing death by driving while uninsured. He was found innocent by the supreme court because the only way in which he caused the victim's death was by simply being on the road at the time.
  • Pagett (1983)

    Factual causation - 'but for test' - D was the factual cause of death when he used his girlfriend as a shield and fired at the police.
  • White (1910)

    Factual causation - 'but for' test - D was acquitted because although he tried to poison his mother, she actually died because of a heart attack so he wasn't a factual cause