18. The Knowledge Argument

• Supervenience is a relation between two types of properties where properties of type A supervene on properties of type B just in case any two things that are exactly alike in their B properties cannot have different A properties
• The distinctness of mental states objection challenges Ryle's behaviourism
• Intentional content breaks down into intentional object and aspectual shape
• Another term for logical possibility is conceivability
• Not all eliminative materialists think that Intentionality is irreducible
• Physicalism is a monist theory
• Ned Block's China mind experiment is supposed to show the possibility of a functional duplicate with no qualia
• The masked man fallacy challenges the inference of metaphysical possibility from logical possibility
• Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia came up with the conceptual problem of interaction
• David Lewis replies to Putnam's multiple realisability to Mind-Brain Type-Identity Theory
• Mary learns a new 'phenomenal' fact when she sees the tomato
• Phenomenal facts are often difficult to describe and can be identified by contrasting examples
• When Mary sees the tomato, she gains a new 'phenomenal' fact
• The Knowledge Argument by Frank Jackson argues for property dualism
• Ability knowledge is knowing 'how' to do something, acquaintance knowledge is knowledge gained by direct experience, and propositional knowledge is knowing 'that' some claim is true or false
• Three objections to the knowledge argument: new ability knowledge + no new propositional knowledge, new acquaintance + old fact, new description + old fact
• Responses to Objection 1: Mary DOES gain propositional knowledge and the ability to imagine seeing red is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing what it's like to see red
• Responses to Objection 2: Acquaintance knowledge involves propositional knowledge and the objection misunderstands the argument
• The knowledge argument may fail to show that physicalism is false because Mary didn't know everything about other people's colour experiences before she left the room
• Jackson’s thought experiment supports property dualism as it suggests that there are non-physical mental properties in the form of phenomenal properties
• According to Jackson, Mary learns what it is like for humans to see red
• If Mary learns something new when she leaves her room then colour experience cannot be a physical state and therefore physicalism is false