Philosophy UNIT 2 Week 5

• Skeptical Hypothesis


  Doubtful proposition challenging common knowledge (e.g., the brain-in-a-vat scenario)
• Gettier Case


  Scenario where justified true belief doesn't constitute knowledge (e.g., belief in being a brain in a vat)
• Epistemology


  Study of knowledge, justification, and belief
• Thought Experiments


  Hypothetical scenarios to explore philosophical concepts (e.g., the Chinese Room)
• Strong AI


  Belief that implementing certain computational processes equals having a mind
• Chinese Room


  Thought experiment illustrating limits of computational understanding (e.g., Searle's Chinese Room)
• Simulation vs. Reality


  Contrast between simulated phenomena and genuine reality (e.g., simulated minds vs. real minds)
• Causal Relations


  Connections between cause and effect (e.g., brain causing mental events)
• Constitutive Relations


  Relationships where one thing constitutes another (e.g., mind constituted by brain)
• Mind-Brain Relationship


  Connection between mental processes and physical brain
• Justification


  Grounds for believing something is true
• Understanding


  Comprehension of meaning or significance (e.g., understanding Chinese)
• Semantics vs. Syntax


  Meaning vs. structure of language (e.g., in the Chinese Room, syntax without semantics)
• Computational Structure


  Framework governing computational processes (e.g., rules governing the Chinese Room)
• Artificial Intelligence


  Simulated intelligence in machines (e.g., Strong AI)
• Turing Test


  Evaluation of a machine's ability to exhibit human-like intelligence (e.g., AI passing Turing Test)
• Consciousness


  State of awareness and subjective experience
• Intelligence


  Capacity for learning, reasoning, and problem-solving
• Chinese Room Argument


  Challenges sufficiency of computational simulation for genuine understanding (e.g., Searle's lack of understanding in the Chinese Room)
• Whole Systems Objection


  Contends that the entire system, including the room, understands Chinese (e.g., the Chinese Room as a whole system)
• Computational Structure Objection


  Raises doubts about whether the Chinese Room replicates the computational structure of a mind (e.g., differences in states and rules)
• Causal vs. Constitutive Argument

  Considers the relationship between mind and brain (e.g., brain causing mental events vs. constituting the mind)
• Searle does not think that we are machines in any meaningful sense. He argues against the idea that the mind can be reduced to computational processes, suggesting that there is more to consciousness and understanding than mere computation.
• Searle does not deny that our brains can be described as running programs in a metaphorical or analogical sense. However, he argues that the computational processes in the brain are fundamentally different from the formal symbol manipulation performed by digital computers.
• Searle does not consider himself a dualist in the traditional sense. Although he acknowledges the causal relationship between the brain and mental states, he rejects the idea that the mind is entirely independent of the physical brain.
• Searle does not believe that proponents of strong AI necessarily assume that the mind is a part of the natural biological world. He argues against the view that all there is to having a mind is implementing certain kinds of computational processes, suggesting that understanding and consciousness cannot be reduced to purely computational mechanisms.
• Original Meaning


  Intrinsic significance of a symbol or sequence, independent of external interpretation
• Derived Meaning


  Extrinsic significance assigned to a symbol or sequence based on external interpretation
• Substrate Independence


  Concept that minds can exist in various physical substrates, not limited to biological systems
• Searle's Argument


  • Asserts that genuine thinking requires original meaning, questioning the sufficiency of programmed semantic content for computer thought
• Simulation Argument (Bostrom)


  • Proposition suggesting that either humanity is likely living in a computer simulation or some alternative surprising reality exists
• Functionalism


  Theory asserting that mental states are defined by their functional role in the cognitive system, not by their physical substrate
• Indifference Principle


  States that an observer should reason as if they were randomly selected from all possible observers, crucial in Bostrom's Simulation Argument
• Original Meaning


  Intrinsic, while Derived Meaning is extrinsic and based on external interpretation
• Searle's Argument


  • Posits that genuine thinking necessitates original meaning, challenging the idea that programmed semantic content can lead to computer thought
• Simulation Argument (Bostrom)


  • Suggests that either humanity is likely living in a simulation or some other surprising reality exists, relying on principles like substrate independence and simulated consciousness
• Inductive Reasoning


  Drawing general conclusions from specific observations, a key component in evaluating the probability of living in a simulation in Bostrom's argument
• Modus Ponens


  Logical rule stating that if a conditional statement (If P then Q) is true, and the antecedent (P) is true, then the consequent (Q) must be true. Used in analyzing logical implications within arguments
• According to equation (F), the fraction of all observers with human-type experiences that live in simulations is approximately 0.00009999
• Bostrom believes that the supposition that 1 percent of all civilizations at our current level of development go on to invent technologies for simulating human-type minds is unreasonable