Meta-ethics

• moral realism

  The belief that right and wrong actually exist; they are real properties.
• cognitivism

  The belief that moral statements are subject to being either true or false.
• naturalism

  The idea that moral values can be correctly defined by observation of the natural world.
• what is ethical naturalism?

  -ethical naturalism believes that moral truths can be discovered by observation of the world

  -what is right and wrong can be established by looking at the world around us

  -it is a moral realist theory (believing that moral facts or truths actually exist) and is also cognitivist, believing that statements made about right and wrong are subject to being either true or false

  -naturalists believe that ethical terms are meaningful.
• versions of ethical naturalism

  -different versions, but key feature that moral values can be defined and discovered by looking at some aspect of the world around us (known empirically):

  --> Aquinas would hold to a theological naturalism. The world has a God-given order built into it. Moral values can be worked out by understanding our God-given purpose & observing natural order

  --> British philosopher F.H. Bradley (1846-1924) argued possible to understand our moral duties by observing our position/station in life. Although to some extent this is outdated & has hint of Victorian class divisions, could be argued certain roles, e.g., teacher, nurse, do seem to have certain duties/moral values attached to them

  --> utilitarian thinkers, e.g. Bentham and Mill, argue we can discover right and wrong by discovering what actions lead to pleasure/pain. By observing stabbing someone causes them pain, we can infer it is wrong
• naturalism and absolutism

  -ethical naturalism links very strongly with the idea of absolutism; however, they are not necessarily the same thing

  -one way of arguing for ethical naturalism is to use the thinking of NL; moral values we discover when we consider purpose do indeed create absolute rules

  -equally, there could be a utilitarian form of naturalism. However, if a thinker believes that right and wrong are linked to pleasure and pain, there may be more relative moral truths discovered
• F.H. Bradley quote

  "What he has to do depends on what his place is, what his function is, and that all comes from his station in the organism" ('Ethical Studies')
• meta-ethics as 2 connected debates

  -meta-ethics is a discussion about the meaning of ethical words such as 'good'

  --> are they statements that can in some sense be true or false? Some say moral language is cognitive (when we say 'murder is wrong', we are saying something that can be shown to be either true or false), while other philosophers disagree and suggest it is non-cognitive - when we make a moral statement, we are expressing our feelings on an issue

  -second, related debate is about reality and existence

  --> some philosophers are realists and argue that moral truths actually exist and are real features of the world. Other philosophers, anti-realists, reject this, claiming that there are no moral truths in the world
• alien example and naturalism

  -in 'The Philosophy Gym', Stephen Law gives the example of alien visitors Flib and Flob witnessing a mugging

  -their earthling companion explains what they have seen is wrong

  -the aliens are puzzled and explain they have similar senses and have seen the purse being taken, the robber running away, heard the shouts, etc., but they cannot with any of their senses detect 'wrongness'
• ethical non-naturalism

  Moral statements have a distinct kind of property but it's not to be confused with a natural property.
• intuitionism

  -suggests 'good' and 'bad' actually exist but can't be seen or discovered in the same way as other facts

  -moral truths are self-evident and are known (indefinable)
• naturalism is right to say moral values are a feature of the world because: weakness

  -Mill argues we are able to know what is good or desirable as these are the things that people actually desire

  -fact that people want happiness is enough to show that happiness is actually a good thing

  --> BUT Hume rejects the conventional wisdom of his day that right and wrong can be observed. There is a fact-value distinction or gap. He is concerned that we move too easily from factual statements ('is' and 'is not') to moral statements ('ought' and 'ought not'). Similar to the example of Flib and Flob, he adds that when we consider an action that is wrong, we cannot empirically detect the vice or wrongness
• naturalism is right to say moral values are a feature of the world because: weakness

  -naturalists might also point to the fact that there is significant agreement on moral values throughout the world

  -fact we largely agree on what is right and wrong suggests this is a factual matter (similar to us agreeing that bricks are a solid and not a liquid or gas) rather than a matter of opinion (such as discussion of whether an artist's music is good)

  --> BUT naturalism is guilty of a thinking error called the naturalistic fallacy. This claims that if something is natural, then it must be good. We may be wrong to equate the two, however. Nature has given us sharp teeth that makes it natural for us to eat meat - it may even bring us pleasure to do so, yet we cannot jump from this to the conclusion that it would be morally wrong to be a vegetarian
• naturalism is right to say moral values are a feature of the world because: weaknesses

  -naturalists worry reducing morality to a matter of taste or opinion reduces the significance of ethical debates

  -discussing whether or not killing is wrong is not the same as discussing food preferences

  --> BUT G.E. Moore offers a criticism of Mill's naturalism in his open question argument. Pleasure can't be the same thing as goodness as it is still possible to ask if the pleasure is truly good. For example, eating chips is a pleasure, but we can still ask whether this is truly good

  --> some forms of naturalism, particularly that of Aquinas, make the assumption that there is a purpose or telos for humans, and this may ultimately require the existence of God. Many modern philosophers, including Sartre with his existentialism, would reject these assumptions. If there is no definite purpose, there cannot be any definite ideas on goodness
• intuitionism

  -intuitionism mainly associated with G.E. Moore (1873-1958)

  -Moore accepts Hume's point that there seems to be a gap between facts and values (the 'is' and the 'ought'), hence naturalism is wrong to suggest that moral values can be discovered

  -in his book 'Principia Ethica', Moore explores this problem with his open question argument

  -he suggests there are 2 types of questions we can ask:

  --> closed questions are questions where only 1 answer is actually possible, e.g., if we are told that someone is a bachelor, the question 'Is he unmarried?' only has one possible answer (like asking if a particular triangle happens to have three sides)

  --> open questions are questions where several different answers are possible, e.g., asking if a bachelor's hair is brown could have several possible answers. Likewise, the question 'Does the triangle have a right angle?' has more than 1 possible answer
• intuitionism continued

  -Moore uses his different types of questions to reject naturalism

  -if Mill is right that pleasure is good, then it ought to be a closed question to ask if something that brings pleasure is really good

  -this is not the case, however

  -something that brings us pleasure may or may not be good; it is an open question

  -this problem arises whenever we try to define what is good in terms of something that is observable in the world
• understanding 'good'

  -Moore thinks 'goodness' can't be defined, but he is still a cognitivist and realist (are truths about what is right and wrong)

  -goodness is known intuitively; it is indefinable but self-evident

  -Moore makes a comparison with the colour 'yellow'

  --> we would struggle if we were asked to define what yellowness is, yet each of us knows and recognises the colour and is able to point to it. Similarly, goodness cannot be described but we can point to many examples that we 'just know' are good

  -Moore argues 'good' is a simple idea

  -like the concept of yellow, it can't be broken into parts or properties

  -a complex idea might be something like a horse, where we could list the parts or break the idea down into components, for example legs, mane, ears, etc.

  --> we can't list the parts of yellowness or goodness because they are simple ideas
• G. E. Moore quote 


  'If I am asked "What is good?" my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked "How is good to be defined?" my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all l have to say about it.'

  ('Principia Ethica')
• intuitionism is right to say moral values are indefinable and self-evident because: weaknesses

  -intuitionism takes the fact-value problem seriously and does not attempt to find moral values through observation of the world

  --> BUT although there is much moral agreement in the world, there is still disagreement. Particular difficulty for intuitionists, who would claim these truths are self-evident to all. Prichard (intuitionist) has attempted to address this by arguing intuitions of some are better than others

  -intuitionism recognises there is considerable moral agreement in the world

  --> BUT intuitionism seems unscientific and far-fetched. Not clear what this strange 'faculty or power of intuition' actually is (not something that can be scientifically analysed). Thus evolutionary explanations of morality such as those offered by Dawkins or psychological explanations such as those given by Freud may be better accounts of morality
• intuitionism is right to say moral values are indefinable and self-evident because: weaknesses

  -unlike emotivism, intuitionism is able to establish moral facts and ensure that 'right' and 'wrong' are not just a matter of taste or opinion

  --> BUT if moral values are not empirical and we 'just know' what is right and wrong, there seems little difference between this and our 'just feeling' certain things are right or wrong. This would lead us towards emotivism

  --> intuitionism makes ethics seem like maths, where truths are self-evident and just obviously true. They are not the same, however. Mathematicians do not argue about what 5x7 might equate to and, unlike in ethics, if there were such an argument in maths it could be resolved using concrete examples

  --> Warnock says anyone who appeals to intuition is immediately "going down the slippery slope of subjectivism"
• W. D. Ross

  -is a deontological intuitionist

  -prima facie duties (first sight) mean a person can recognise the right intuitive duty to follow from a list of around 7

  --> fidelity duties (keeping promises), reparation, gratitude, non-maleficence (avoiding injuring others), justice, beneficence (improving conditions of others) and self-improvement

  -acting on the duty of gratitude means taking your mothers to a hospital appointment rather than going to a concert with your friends
• emotivism

  The belief that ethical terms evince approval or disapproval.
• the fork and the Circle

  -emotivism as a meta-ethical theory comes from A.J. Ayer (1910-89)

  -Ayer's verification principle, which provides the background to his ideas, owes a great deal to the ideas of Hume as well as the Vienna Circle

  -Hume argues there are 2 types of knowledge that philosophers can obtain:

  --> relation of ideas: a priori knowledge of how ideas relate to each other, e.g. that 2 + 3 = 5

  --> matters of fact: a posteriori knowledge of things we can observe in the world, e.g. water boils at 100 degrees

  -Hume famously argues any books that do not contain either of the above should be "committed to the flames"

  -the Vienna Circle was influenced by Wittgenstein's early philosophy & shared his view that the aim of philosophy was the analysis of language to determine what was 'sense' and what was 'nonsense'

  --> they suggested statements were only meaningful if they could be verified by the senses
• Ayer's verification principle

  -Ayer's verification principle combines the ideas of Hume and the Vienna Circle

  -he argues that a statement is meaningful if it is either:

  --> analytic: true by definition, e.g. 'The bachelor is unmarried'

  --> synthetic: possible to say how (at least in theory) it would be possible to verify it, e.g. 'The cat is asleep at 4 a.m.'

  -any statements that do not fit into these categories are not cognitive and are thus meaningless

  -moral statements are not obviously logical nor can any matter of fact prove them to be true

  --> so ethical statements are factually meaningless
• how to understand ethical statements

  -Ayer is concerned not with what ethical statements mean, but with what they are for

  --> what are people doing when they use the words 'good', 'bad', 'right' and 'wrong'?

  -he argues ethical statements are simply expressions of personal preferences or emotions

  -Ayer is influenced by Hume, who was one of the first philosophers to link morality to feelings rather than reason

  -if I say you were wrong to tell a lie, the word 'wrong' doesn't add any factual content

  --> might as well say 'You told a lie in a disapproving tone'
• Hume quote

  "Take any action allowed to be vicious ... examine it in all its lights and see if you can find that matter of fact... which you call vice. You will never find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation which arises in you, toward the action ... tis the object of feeling, not reason" ('A Treatise of Human Nature')
• Ayer quote

  "The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if I say to someone,"You acted wrongly in stealing that money," I am not saying anything more than if I had simply said, "You stole that money." In adding that this action is wrong I am not making any further statement about it. I am simply evincing my moral disapproval of it. It is as if I had said, "You stole that money," in a peculiar tone of horror, or written it with the addition of some special exclamation marks." ('Language, Truth, and Logic')
• emotivism is right to suggest moral statements merely show approval and disapproval of actions because:

  -emotivism has an easier task in explaining why people have different moral views on many topics

  --> there are no 'facts' about right and wrong, there are just feelings and attitudes

  -emotivism avoids the issue of the naturalistic fallacy, which causes great difficulty for the naturalist, as it rejects the idea that moral values are linked to anything in the world; they are merely the product of our sentiments

  -emotivism recognises disputes in ethics are often driven by feelings rather than reasons

  --> echoes work of psychologist Daniel Goleman on emotional intelligence, in which he argues the emotional part of our brain reacts before the reasoning part kicks in
• emotivism is wrong to suggest moral statements merely show approval and disapproval of actions because:

  -emotivism renders debate of ethics useless

  --> in philosophical debate, one seeks to persuade the other to change their position by providing reasons, yet this would seem futile if both sides are merely expressing feelings & attitudes

  --> critics have suggested debate becomes a 'boo-hurray' shouting match

  -emotivism can be said to trivialise ethical discussion

  --> Philippa Foot cites the example of concentration camps to suggest Ayer's view can't be right (there are significant ethical debates that shouldn't be reduced to a matter of opinion)

  -even for some non-cognitivists, the idea that we are merely expressing feelings and attitudes is not a complete description of what moral language is aiming to do

  --> Hare has argued moral language is in fact prescriptive; it is an attempt to persuade others to adopt our view
• C.L. Stevenson

  -the meaning of moral statements is more than simple expressions

  --> they are attempts to influence or persuade others of our attitude

  -'giving to charity is good' means 'I think it is morally important and so should you'

  -ethical statements can be quite powerfully conveyed e.g. 'rape' instead of 'non-consenting intercourse'

  --> emotionally stirs us up to action, so can be useful