Essay plans

• Can substance dualism be defended? (25)

  • no, it faces convincing counter arguments
  • intro - dualist theories argue there are two kinds of thing, substance dualism suggests the mind and the physical are separate substances
• P1: Conceptual interaction problem:

  
  

  A general issue for substance dualism is how the mental can interact with the physical when they are defined as separate substances. It does not appear logical for a non physical substance to somehow transfer to the physical world and cause an action. Eg. hunger (mental) causing the body (physical) to start eating.
• Example addressed to Descartes:

  
  

  Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia raised this to Descartes himself, suggesting if substance dualism is true, the mind cannot move the body. However, it is reasonable to suggest the mind can move the body so she concluded that substance dualism is false.
• Response to conceptual problem:

  
  

  Descartes can be interpreted as providing a scientific response. He refers to the 'little gland' (pineal) which accounts for how the mind moves the body. The interpretation of Descartes writings remain subjective as it does not appear to coherently defend substance dualism.
• P2: Empirical interaction problem:

  
  

  The law of conservation of energy states that 'in a closed system, energy cannot be added or removed, it can only be transferred'. As our universe is a closed system, energy would be added every time we think if substance dualism were true. Therefore, if substance dualism were true the law of conservation of energy must be false. If we were to accept the substance dualist account, we would be denying compelling evidence to suggest that the laws of physics we know today are false. Therefore, it is only reasonable to reject substance dualism.
• P3: Descartes conceivability argument

  
  

  Relying on the notion of clear and distinct ideas, Descartes argues that the mind and body are separate substances. I have a clear and distinct idea that my mind is a thinking thing, not extended in space. I have a clear and distinct idea that my body is not a thinking thing, extended in space. It is conceivable and therefore possible that my mind and body exist independently. So my mind and body are separate substances.
• Response to conceivability argument (1)

  Mind without body is not conceivable. Behaviourism suggests 'to talk of mental states is to talk of behaviour'. To have behavioural dispositions is to move your body in certain ways. So if behaviourism is correct, it is impossible to have a mind or mental states without a body. If mind was without body, it would lead to a contradiction and contradictions are inconceivable. Therefore mind without body is inconceivable and the conceivability argument fails.
• Response to conceivability argument (2)

  What is conceivable may not be possible. Descartes infers that the claim mind without body is conceivable suggests it is possible and further that it is correct. The masked man fallacy can be shown to illustrate Descartes flawed conclusions.

  • I conceive Batman as a caped crusader
  • I conceive Bruce Wayne as a billionaire, not a capped crusader
  • Therefore Batman is not Bruce Wayne

  Just because Descartes has an idea the mind and body are separate, it does not conclude they must be separate
• Descartes response to the Masked man fallacy

  There is a difference between the masked man analogy of Batman and Bruce Wayne and Descartes conceivability. The ideas in the masked man are not clear and distinct (true through rational intuition) so the analogy cannot be used to attack Descartes.

  However, the notion of clear and distinct ideas being a defence for Descartes seems invalid. Descartes uses his previous theory to support his conceivability argument. The use of circular reasoning (Cartesian circle) means Descartes cannot defend his argument successfully.
• P4: Descartes divisibility argument:

  • My body is divisible
  • My mind is indivisible
  • Therefore mind and body are separate

  There is an implied premise in this argument which comes from Leibniz law of indiscernibility of identicals: which suggests that if two things are the same, they have identical properties. So mind and body must be separate according to Descartes because of the nature of divisibility.
• Response to the divisibility argument (1)

  The mind is divisible. We can reject the second premise and suggest the mind is divisible in some way. For example, there are many forms of mental illness where the mind appears divided.

  • Multiple personality disorder provides compelling counter evidence that each half of the mind can be completely separate from each other: having different memories, beliefs and traits.
  • The surgical procedure corpus colostomy also suggest the mind is divisible; often used in cases of severe epilepsy, surgeons sever the left and right hemispheres.
• Response to the divisibility argument (2)

  
  

  Not everything that is physical is divisible. Even if Descartes argues that the mind is not spatially divisible, we can reject premise 1 and suggest not all physical is divisible.

  • We can divide the body, but if you keep dividing there will become a point where atoms become sub atomic and eventually you cannot divide anymore.
  • If it is possible to reach a point where physical matter is indivisible, Descartes argument cannot be accepted as a succesful defence of substance dualism.
• Can property dualism be defended (25)

  • no, arguments lack compelling reasoning
  • intro - there are at least some mental properties that are neither reducible or supervenient upon physical properties, there is just one type of substance (physical) buy physical substances can have non-physical properties (qualia)
• P1 - Evolution

  Natural selection rules out the property dualist notion of qualia (non intentional, introspective phenomenal properties). The theory suggests that the environment selects genes which aid survival and reproduction. (Giraffes have evolved to have long necks, enabling them to reach trees and eat the leaves). There is no evolutionary advantage of having a subjective phenomenal experience (qualia)
• P2 - Zombies (Chalmers)

  The concept that there are 'philosophical zombies' which are behaviourally and physically identical to humans yet have no qualia. It is conceivable that zombies exist, therefore it is possible due to no logical contradiction that zombies exist. This means that the notion of qualia are non physical and do not supervene on the physical. Defending the claim of property dualism.
• Response to Zombie argument (1)

  
  

  Zombies are not conceivable. We can reject P1 and suggest the notion of philosophical zombies are not conceivable as Chalmers suggested. If we had enough physical knowledge, qualia would be understood in physical terms. Due to a lack of knowledge surrounding qualia, it would be more appropriate to suggest it is an illusion and zombies are not conceivable.
• Response to Zombie argument (2)

  Even if we were to accept Zombies to be conceivable and logically possible, the concept of philosophical zombies is not metaphysically possible. An analogy of water and H20 can be used to illustrate this challenge effectively. To have water without having H20 is metaphysically impossible (as water is H20 by its very nature). Likewise, to have a physical duplicate without qualia is metaphysically impossible.
• Challenge to response (2) to Zombie argument

  Property dualists would suggests there is an inconsistency between the analogy of water/H20 and the zombie argument. The analogy is weak and does not explain metaphysical possibility successfully
• P3- Knowledge argument

  In a thought experiment presented by Frank Jackson, Mary knows all of the physical facts about colour despite only ever experiencing a black and white room. When leaving the room, Mary will gain new knowledge on what it is like to see the colour red. This suggests all physical facts aren't enough to know all facts, meaning some facts are non -physical. If non-physical facts about non-physical properties exist, qualia exists and therefore property dualism is true.
• Response (1) to knowledge argument

  Mary would gain new ability knowledge. When seeing red for the first time, Mary would gain an ability to see red (not propositional knowledge). Jackson misses a crucial point in his defence of property dualism.
• Response (2) to knowledge argument

  Mary would gain new acquaintance knowledge when seeing red for the first time. This is because she is now directly experiencing red for the first time.
• Response (3) to knowledge argument

  New knowledge old fact. The same fact (red) is being understood through multiple concepts. For example, in the black and white room Mary knows the theoretical terms of red so when she leaves the room, she experiences red in phenomenal terms. Jackson's argument fails through this challenge as Mary is not gaining an new knowledge, she is simply experiencing it in a different way.
• Can behaviourism be defended? (25)

  • no, compelling counter arguments
  • 'to talk of mental states is to talk of behaviour'
  • Ryle, Hemple
• P1 - Zombies

  Philosophical zombies have all behavioural dispositions of pain, yet no pain in their mental state (qualia). If zombies are possible, then behaviour must be separate from mental states. This would mean behaviourism as a perspective fails.
• Response to zombies

  Ryle - To say mental states are separate from behaviour would be a categorical mistake. He uses the analogy Oxford University. When touring someone around the university you show them the library, the students and the lecture halls yet they still ask where the university is. Ryle would say they are missing the point, the university is made of these parts. The analogy is to show that various behavioural dispositions associated with pain is to show what the mental state of pain is. It is a categorical mistake to suggest otherwise.
• Response to Ryle (category mistake)

  Putnam suggests another example: the Super Spartans. The Super Spartans are an imaginary group of people who suppress any outward demonstration of pain (no behavioural dispositions) yet still experience internal, subjective pain. If Super Spartans are possible, then behaviourism is false as it is possible to have the mental state without the disposition. Suggesting there must be more to mental states than behaviour.
• P2 - Asymmetry between self and other knowledge

  When I am in pain, I experience it directly yet when someone else in in pain, I experience it indirectly as I do not literally experience their pain. Further, when I experience pain, there is no chance I could be mistaken as to what I feel yet when others appear to be in pain there is a chance I could be mistaken. Behaviourism rules out asymmetry of knowledge yet we experience asymmetry often, as there is a difference in how we experience our own and others mental states. So behaviourism is false.
• Ryle's response to asymmetry

  The asymmetry of self and other knowledge is an illusion. We have far more information about self knowledge than other peoples. There is no difference in the two, we just pay our own knowledge more attention meaning we have more evidence of our own knowledge.
• Challenge to Ryle's response to asymmetry

  No amount of knowledge of a persons behaviour could give us insight to their qualia. There will always be asymmetry between self and other. It is an inaccuracy to suggest that there is no asymmetry.
• P3 - Multiple realisability

  The same mental state an be realised through multiple mental states depending on other mental states which need to be analysed in terms of behaviour, which may vary depending on the mental state. This can go forever, so it is impossible for behaviourism to explain mental states as behaviours without assuming other mental states. Behaviourism does not give a full account of mental states without referring to other mental states and therefore fails.
• P4 - Circularity

  We can further press the multiple realisability challenge to suggest the behaviourist approach to analysing mental states is circular. This is because behaviourism assumes other mental states when giving an analysis of states in terms of behavioural dispositions. Meaning behaviourism is incomplete as we can never define mental states in terms of behaviour without circularity.
• Are mental states functional states?

  • no, thought experiments and theories suggest functionalism is not correct
  • intro - mental states are functional eg. pain causes desire for it to stop and movement away (Putnam for)
• P1: Avoids multiple reliability

  • 'Same mental states can come from different brain states' BTI objection but for functionalism
  • Functionalists would agree mental states are analogous to a knife as it can be made from plastic, metal, wood etc as long as it fulfils its function (to cut things)
  • Similar to mental states as pain isn't analysed in terms of s specific characteristic (c -fibres) but pain is a functional state, not specific to any physical so functionalism avoids multiple realisability argument and can allow humans, octopuses and aliens to feel pain
• P2: Avoids circularity

  • Other theories (behaviourism) fail due to circularity as mental states are solely in terms of behavioural dispositions so takes a narrower view by associating specific states with specific behaviours
  • The functional role of mental states within an organism is to do more than simply cause behaviours as mental states can cause other mental states.
  • It avoids tying specific states to specific behaviours so avoids being circular
• Responses to functionalism

  • Inverted spectrum
  • Zombies
  • Knowledge argument
  • China brain
• P3: Inverted spectrum

  • What if my experience of green was your experience of red?
  • When we look at grass, our functional states would be identical so functionalism would say they are the same mental state. However, they are clearly not the same as my qualia is completely different to yours.
  • Functionalism must be false as states can be different despite being functionally identical
• P4: Zombies

  • Functionally identical to a human with no qualia
  • The zombies mental state would be functionally identical to a normal humans, however the zombies mental state is clearly not the same as the zombie lacks qualia so functionalism must be false
  • (Zombies are conceivable and therefore possible)
• P5: Knowledge argument

  • Mary knows all functional facts of seeing colour despite living in a black and white room
  • When Mary leaves the room and sees red for the first time, she will learn something new
  • So seeing red must be something more than just a functional state therefore functionalism must be false
• P6: China Brain

  • Blocks thought experiment - setup which is a functionally identical mind but shows it is clearly not the same
  • Complete functional description of mental states and a human body is hooked up to population of China (number of neurons)
  • Everyone has a two way radio to communicate according to the description and some are connected to outputs of the body and recreate the firing of neurons
  • Has functionally identical states to human so functionalism says the China brain would be in pain when input eg. stabbed but it is clearly not in pain so functionalism is wrong