Italy 4: fall of fascism

    Cards (27)

    • Mussolini's foreign policy aims
      - M wanted to make italy 'great, respected and feared', prioritising appearances over all
      1. to increase prestige by overcoming 'mutilated victory' of ToV. Involved acquiring lands in Balkans e.g. Fiume + Albania
      2. create an African empire to rival W powers. Strengthening control in Libya + new territories such as Abyssinia
      3. turn the Med into an 'Italian Lake', challenging B and F influence
      4. autarky, new territories would make Italy rich in natural resources and labour
      5. eventually go to war, to toughen up and radicalise the pop into committed Fascists
    • Where did his FP initially stand?

      - he saw B and F influence in the Med as 'iron bars' which imprisoned Italy
      - he couldn't challenge this before H rose to power in 33 however, since the Italians could not match the B Royal navy
      - through the 20s he had been cautious, relying on diplomacy and using grand statements to enhance Italy's world status
    • Impacts of FP successes and failures in the 1920s?
      - M wanted to maintain peaceful relations with the Great Powers, largely since Italy was dependant for financial support, he could afford more violent approaches to smaller powers e.g. Greece
      - Italy had claimed the Ionian islands, which included Corfu, since 1911. Mussolini sought to avenge the murder of an Italian official working in the border area of Greece and Albania.
      -He blamed the Greek government for the murder and went on to seize the island of Corfu, demanding 50mil lira as compensation from the Greek gov and an official apology.
      - Although Italy was one of the four permanent members of the LoN, Mussolini argued that the dispute had nothing to do with the League, since the Italian official was not working under its direction.
    • Events in Corfu, 1923
      - After lengthy negotiations, B agreed to M's demand that the dispute needed to be settled by the Conference of Ambassadors ( Italy, Britain, France and Japan aiming to settle territorial disputes after WWI) rather than the League of Nations itself, on the condition that Italy handed Corfu back to Greece
      -shows Italy's need to work with the major EU powers M received the 50 million lire he demanded and withdrew under increasing international pressure
      - Mussolini could present himself as a dynamic and decisive leader = contrasting weakness of the prev Lib govs
      - image helped to bolster his domestic position.
      - for the next decade he did not attempt to repeat the aggression and instead worked closely with Britain and signed a number of treaties to help continue peaceful negotiations on the continent.
    • Events in Fiume 1924

      - Fiume had been given to Yugoslavia after the First World War and was famously occupied by D'Annunzio in 1919. M's approach was more successful
      - he was able to persuade Yugoslavia to sign the Treaty of Rome in 1924, in which Italy received Fiume
      - M's diplomatic success = great prestige and popularity at home and abroad, giving him the confidence to push for further gains in the Balkans.
      - in reality, Yugoslavia was happy to give up Fiume since they had built a more useful port at Split ( was not mentioned in Fascist prop)
    • Events in Albania in 1925
      - M was keen to show that Italy was the dominant power in the Balkans
      -opportunity in 1925 when an Italian-sponsored chieftain seized power in Albania and become King Zog.
      - Fascist regime supplied him and his supporters with money and encouraged Italian companies to invest in the Albanian economy. Italian officers were used to train and advise the Albanian army
      - A 'Treaty of Friendship' was signed in 1926, which effectively made Albania a satellite state of Italy.
    • Pacifying Libya, until 1932

      - In WW1 the Italian army had been driven back to controlling just the coastal towns of Libya
      - M reasserted Italian power over the whole colony by brutal means = 1/3 of Libya's population dying as a result of methods that inc the use of poison gas and conc camps
      - justified on grounds of racial superiority
      - rebellion was finally crushed by Marshall Badoglio in 1932, and showed insight to Fascist behaviour in the invasion of Abyssinia later
    • Locarno Treaty (1925), Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) and the World Disarmament Conference (1932-3)

      Locarno:
      - showed M playing moderate statesman, Italy + B guaranteed both to respect G's W borders with F and Belgium
      Kellogg:
      - signed by 62 countries and promised to outlaw war as a way to settle international dispute
      World Disarmament Conference:
    • contradictions in Italy's friendly policies
      - Locarno, KB and WDC are all contradicted by M's rearmament policies and boasts that he could 'blot out the sun' with his airforce
      - I was seen as an apparent equal to the Great Powers, and M's image boosted when Churchill expressed admiration. He was not actually an equal and this would crumble down
      - Fascist press portrayed him as a key player globally, irl he was absent from meetings he found boring
    • summary of relations with B and F in the early 1930s
      - appeared respectable and peaceful from outside, M resented them for stopping his ambitions in the med
      - M felt he was not fulfilling his true fascist role as a warlike man of action
      - agreements he made did not commit him to anything binding, he had to wait until he could try something else
      - despite M's claims to be diff from Lib govs, he continued italian trad policy as 'makeweight' power in EU balance
      - M had an ambivalent relationship with G at same time. He gave financial help to Nazis since he thought they could disrupt power balance of EU and be played off against B and F. He was also worried about Anschluss though
    • Events in Austria, 1934

      - in 33 M had tried and failed to bring B, F, G and I into a 'Four Power Pact' to control G, suggesting permitting territorial changes in Czechoslovakia and Poland but not Austria
      - in 34, Austrian Nazis has assass the Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss, in failed attempt to seize power and force Anschluss, M responded by sending troops to the Brenner Pass on the I-Austrian border to stop G if it attempted takeover
      - since H still saw Anschluss as premature, his inaction made him appear to back down. meant M could claim to be heroic and adopt patronising attitude to H. When they first met in venice in 1934, H was diffident and walked a step behind
      - balance of power would shift when rearmament gathered pace
    • the Stresa Front, 1935

      - Meeting between F, B and I leaders (laval, Macdonald and M) to discuss an alliance to counter potential future aggression in Austria by G
      - arranged in response to G declaring it would increase size of armed forces against limits imposed by ToV
      - all 3 countries agreed their countries should remain united against G's military expansion
      - became clear within months this was not the case such as when B made a separate deal with G to expand their navy beyond restrictions in ToV
    • reasons for invading Abyssinia
      1. to compete with EU powers and raise Italy's status globally. Would avenge humiliation of battle of Adowa in 1896 when the I army were easily defeated, prop could contrast Fascist success with Lib failure
      2. to radicalise italians into more warlike nation. after consolidating power, M could now fulfil military triumph dreams to unite and bring glory. To retain rep he also needed to match rhetoric to action soon
      3. economic benefits in the quest for autarky. war related contracts in 32 boosted economy during GD. Abyssinian resources could also be exploited + the colony would be a market for selling goods and destination for emigration
      4. M calculated minimal risks; army of 400,000 and modern weapons, could more than guarantee defeat. B anf F were likely to ignore since Stresa Front showed they were more concerned with G, wanted to keep M as ally against H
    • The Abyssinian War, 1935-36
      - supported by royal family who launched a campaign to donate and melt down gold wedding rings to finance it
      - blessed by Church as a 'civilising mission'
      - fighting lasted longer than expected from oct 35-may 36
      - brutal tactics killed around 500,000 Abyssinians and Italy was the first country to utilise chemical weapons
      - only a few 1000 italian soldiers killed, stats inflated by M to give impression of hard fought campaign
      - LoN condemned with words + imposed sanctions but crucially not on oil, rubber and metal imports which were vital to their ability to conduct operations
      - B, controlling Suez. could have cut comms but didnt
      - M sold victory as high point of Fascist success, enhanching his pop. Prop presented B and F as hypocritical and M standing up to architects of mutilated victory
    • consequences of the Abyssinian invasion

      - short term benefits quickly outweighed by long term costs
      - maj of I troops, 250,000 men, had to stay to fight a guerilla war
      - only 130,000 I's settled there = producing few valuable raw materials and only accounting for 2% of I trafe
      - budget deficit rose from 2.5 to 16 billion lira so M had to devalue the lira (against battle for lira)
      - friendship w B and F destroyed, and I drawn into dependancy on G who had supplied most of the raw materials which had been sanctioned e.g. coal
      - had been his high point and made him overconfident
    • reasons for intervention in the Spanish civil war, 1936-9
      - M intervened on the side of General Franco, leading RW nationalist forced against the LW Spanish Republican gov (who had backing from France and the USSR)
      - M wanted a strategic ally in the Med and expected to be rewarded with naval bases in the Balearic islands
      - the quick victory he expected would bring further prestige as Abyssinia had and help transform I into a more militant soc
      - he thought he could extract concessions from the B and F who seemed weak and willing to appease, since he fought alongside G on side of Franco
    • consequences of intervening in Spain
      - M sent 50,000 'volunteers' + 1000's of artillery guns, tanks and aircraft
      - they didn't fight that effectively and were defeated at the Battle of Guadalajara in 1937, against many opposing troops of anti-fascist Italians. Despite I forces outnumbering Spain 2 to 1 they lost. M could be blamed personally since his attack went against advice from Franco
      - I submarines torpedoed neutral ships (inc B) suspected to carry Republicans in Spain. M denied this but it was proved and he was forced to abandon this policy
      - to recover prestige, M had to make a bigger commitment than planned to ensure they won in 1939
      - massive economic drain, costing 14 billion lire + leading to further devaluation + higher taxes
      - no territory gained and Italy was now the only country in the world w a weaker army in 1939 than four years before
      - B and F both had official stances of neutrality and were alienated by I's actions
      - the war was unpopular in I, M failed to convince public opinion it was necessary
    • The breakdown of the Stresa Front
      - Both Abyssinia and Spain worsened I's relations with B and F who saw M's military adventures as destroyinf peace foundation
      - anger aroused when I submarines and aircraft sunk neutral ships in the Med
      - Stresa front broke down but relations still existed as B FP was around keeping M away from H
      - M was still playing the makeweight tole
    • Moves towards Germany

      - M drew closer to H in 1936 signing the Rome-Berlin Axis and then the Anti-Comintern pact in 1937
      - M was impresed with G strength after a visit to Berlin and wanted to copy fanatical militancy of Nazis
      - M still feared being overshadowed by H and all agreements were carefully insubstantial
    • Events in Munich, Sep 1938
      - showed power shift from M to H in March 38 when H marched into Austria, achieving Anschluss, and M did not do anything (unlike in 34) so status = reduced
      - subservience compounded in sep 38 when G threatened to invade Czechoslovakia and M created deal in Munich, transferring Sudetenland to G
      - I's hailed M as peacemaker, against his role in Fascism based on Vittorio Veneto spirit of 1918 and glorifying war
      - M admired H's strength but feared consequences of being pushed into a war he was unprepared for
      - in jan 1939, ambivalent view shown when he invited Chamberlain to Rome
    • Domestic tensions after 1936
      - growing tensions over direction of regime, since they had started paying the price for foreign policy actions = taxes going up and gov debt as well
      - autarky meant goods became more expensive, since higher duties on imports
      - living standards had declines for most I's, and even the middle class who had gained the most, were suffering
      - some of the elite questioned M's policies, especially over the economy
      - drawing closer to G was concerning since it was evidently not a relationship of equals, Germans were open about viewing Italians as an inferior race. Also copying G policies such as 'reform of customs', anti-Semitic policies and 'Passo Romano' diminished respect for M
      - armaments industry remained enthusiastic since they benefitted most from gov contracts
      - there were still no strikes or riots until 1943, and OVRA didn't report increased difficulty to keep resistance down
    • the Invasion of Albania, april 1939

      - March 39 H broke Munich agreement and invaded rest of Czechoslovakia
      - H had not informed M of intentions once again and this showed lack of trust in M
      - M still wanted to keep up, trying to show equal dominance by invading Albania (in reality it was quite easy as it was alr a satellite state)
      - King Zog was overthrown
      - another show of Fascist violence which pushed Italy away from B and F
    • Pact of Steel, may 1939
      -Negotiated by Mussolini's son-in-law, Ciano.
      -Agreed that Italy and Germany would follow each other into war if one started.
      -Their foreign policy ambitions seemed to be complementary (Germany aimed at Lebensraum in Eastern Europe, Italy wanted to dominate the Mediterranean).
      -Ciano, however, was worried that Italy's rearmament would not be complete by 1943, and was reassured by the Germans that they had no intention of going to war until then.
      -Germany accepted that Italy needed more time to bounce back from the campaigns in Ethiopia and Spain.
      -Mussolini would find it difficult to extricate himself from the commitment made in the Pact of Steel without appearing weak.
      - Ciano was more doubtful than M about the benefits of the alliance
    • Italy's lack of war preparations

      - M to blame since he had headed all 3 armed services for most of the 1930s
      - boasted about commanding 'eight million bayonets', but this was 10x the amount of soldiers and these weren't even modern weapons
      - Italys expenditure on defence did not increase drastically throughout the 30s
    • Policy of Non-belligerence, sep 39-june 40

      - by Aug 39, it was clear G was about to invade Poland and start another world war, creating crisis for M
      - the king, generals and Ciano all advised M that italy should avoid war and the country was not ready
      - Nazi-Soviet pact had also proven that H couldn't be trusted since he had made a deal with Communist enemy
      - if M betrayed Pact of Steel, he acted no differently than Lib Gov which he had openly condemned in 1914. 1 element of consistency in rhetoric was willingness to fight, would be failing his own test
      - H told M that I's intervention would be unnecessary = both relieving and humiliating for M
      - as war began he was worried that he would not be able to make gains in what he saw as the imminent fall of the B and F empires
      - the evacuation of BEF in Dunkirk in May 40 persuaded him to join since he thought the war would end soon
      - only now did he officially abandon makeweight policy
    • Was FP after 1935 always leading to declaration of war? YES
      - fascism had always glorified war. It was the ultimate goal for M and from 35 his army was constantly engaged in combat, staying out would have contradicted everything he stood for
      - Fascism and Nazism shared much in way of ideology, their FP also complemented each other and did not clash
      - M showed contempt for W democracies and so would unlikely side with them, and would not resist potential gains once they lost
    • Was FP after 1935 always leading to declaration of war? NO

      - Fascism was show over substance. He had always been careful not to provoke B or F too much, only declaring war when he thought they were about to be defeated
      - M feared and admired H in equal amounts. Mutual lack of trust shown over Austria and I never committed itself completely
      - Attempts to follow Nazism were half heartedly implemented
      - M's foreign policy = makeweight, he could extract concessions from both sides and kept his options open