WARFARE: 2nd boer

• ARMY STRENGTH (BRITISH)

  • The British had around 250,000 regular soldiers.
  • Reservists numbered around 78,000 in 1899.
  • Most lower-rank soldiers came from the working class.
  • The army provided an escape from poverty and unemployment.
  • Experienced generals- Sir Buller and Lord Roberts.
• ARMY STRENGTH (BOERS)

  • At first outnumbered the British with 50,000 men.
  • British sent reinforcements by sea- 84,000 British soldiers in SA.
  • Inland transport posed challenges to the British- the Boers were used to moving ox-wagons across rough country.
  • The British did not know the Boer territory.
• IMPORTANCE OF RAILWAYS

  • The British controlled the railways, setting up a Department of Military Railways and a specialist unit of railway engineers to repair and extend the rail network.
  • Use of railways between key towns to invade Boer strongholds.
  • In May 1900, the British moved to gain control of the railways in the Transvaal, taking key stations and incorporating Boer lines into their own Imperial Military Railways.
  • Use of armoured trains
• THE BOERS' READINESS FOR WAR

  • Most Boer farmers were skilled hunters and ‘trekkers’, used to riding across rugged country on horses, and most could shoot.
  • The Boers’ only professional soldiers were artillery gunners, with some old field guns, but also modern German and French artillery.
  • Mobile commando fighting units- bands of horsemen.
  • Commandos elected their officers who knew the country.
  • Foreign backers included Germany, and a few hundred foreign volunteers joined the Boers.
• ATTITUDES

  • Mutual respect from both sides.
  • The British attitude to this new colonial war was tinged by the belief that the Boers were pro-German.
  • British army commanders relied on their experience in previous campaigns to see them through.
  • Few soldiers had much knowledge of South Africa, as thousands sailed for another war a long way from home.
• ORGANISATION AND TACTICS

  • Boer generals planned their campaigns.
  • By contrast, the British initially lacked local knowledge.
  • With no General Staff organisation, commanders newly arrived in South Africa were ill-prepared.
  • The British assumed the Boers would surrender when they saw the strength opposing them.
  • The main problem for the British was an outdated tactical approach.
• THE SIEGE OF LADYSMITH

  • Most crucial of the 3 sieges.
  • Surrounded in November 1899 by 35,000 Boers.
  • The British set up a defensive perimeter and settled for a siege.
  • Boers used French siege guns.
  • The Boers made only one attempt to assault the town, on the 6th January 1900, attacking the weaker southern sector.
• BLACK WEEK

  • British response to the sieges led by Sir Buller.
  • 10-17th December 1899.
  • Successive defeats- caused outrage and grief at home.
  • Gatacre with 3,000 men to recapture Stormberg
  • Methuen with 10,000 men to relieve Kimberley and Mafeking
  • Buller with about 20,000 troops to relieve Ladysmith.
• STORMBERG

  • Gatacre’s force travelled by train to within marching distance of Stormberg, a railway junction near the Orange Free State border.
  • 10th December 1899- failed dismally.
  • British infantry exposed to Boer rifle fire were forced to retreat, leaving 500 behind.
• MAGERSFONTEIN

  • Methuen was supposed to advance along the railway but was blocked by Boers.
  • 11th December 1899- British attacked but had not scouted properly, and walked into a Boer trap.
  • British troops were exposed to scorching sun and enemy fire and, when their guns opened fire on the hill, they were shelled from their side.
  • Lost 200 men
• COLENSO

  • 15th December 1899
  • Not knowing the local geography, without proper maps and poorly guided, officers sent troops across the river in the wrong places, and into heavy Boer fire.
  • Buller called off the assault, even though the British had occupied the town of Colenso, and in the confusion, while some soldiers withdrew, more were taken prisoner.
  • The British lost 143 dead, 756 wounded and 220 captured – the Boers just eight dead and 30 wounded.
• SPION KOP

  • British infantry took what they believed to be the hilltop- exposed to Boers firing from higher ground.
  • Poor communications led to some men being told to defend Spion Kop, while others withdrew.
  • Heavy losses for the British- 1,350 casualties (243 dead).
• THE RELIEF OF LADYSMITH

  • January 1900, Lord Roberts arrived in SA as commander-in-chief.
  • Using pontoon bridges to cross the Tugela, and with artillery bombardment, the British forced the Boers to withdraw.
  • On 28th February 1900, Buller’s troops marched into Ladysmith and the 118-day siege was over.
• KIMBERLEY

  • Besieged since 14th October 1899.
  • Roberts took personal command of the relief force, setting out on 10th February 1900 with 40,000 men.
  • A veteran of India and the First Boer War, Roberts used superior numbers to push back the Boers until, on 15 February, Sir John French’s cavalry fought through to Kimberley to lift the 124-day siege.
• MAFEKING

  • In command of 1,200 against 7,000 Boers was Colonel Robert Baden-Powell.
  • His tactics included fake landmines, dummy guns and moving his real cannons around the defences to pretend he had more.
  • He armed 300 Africans, used teenage boys as messengers and sent an armoured train to attack the Boer camp.
  • On 17th May 1900, the relief force under Colonel Mahon lifted the siege and, after 217 days, news of the ‘Relief of Mafeking’ was greeted with jubilation in Britain.
• EFFECT OF THE SIEGES

  • Black Week in particular was a shock to British confidence.
  • The defeats were widely reported in the newspapers, and commented on by soldiers’ letters home, changing public opinion about the war from positive to negative.
  • The war had begun in a mood of patriotic optimism, but photographs of British casualties and reports of confusion and ineptitude caused outrage.
  • Gave the British time to reinforce- by the end of January 1900, there were 180,000 British and colonial troops.
• GENERAL BULLER (1ST PHASE)

  • Sir Redvers Buller was experienced in previous wars.
  • Buller appeared confident, giving the impression to journalists that the war would be short since British soldiers would soon defeat the ‘amateur’ Boers.
  • A shortage of horses and cavalry soldiers for scouting was another reason why the British lacked good intelligence.
  • After Buller returned to Britain in the autumn of 1900, he was honoured as a war hero, but his reputation was damaged.
  • By critics, Buller has been portrayed as the epitome of military incompetence.
• FIELD MARSHAL ROBERTS (2ND PHASE)

  • Roberts picked his headquarters staff from India and the Staff College in England – choosing a team was an indication of Roberts’ methodical approach.
  • Must raise British morale.
  • He issued fresh instructions- It was better to outflank the Boers, forcing them to retreat or face being surrounded
  • Roberts wanted cavalry and mounted infantry to scout territory and to chase the Boers.
  • Ordered repairs to damaged railways.
• FIELD MARSHAL KITCHENER (END OF THE WAR)

  • As commander-in-chief from November 1900, Kitchener took charge of the last phase of the war, which dragged on for another year and a half.
  • The determination of Boer guerrillas forced the British into a ‘war of attrition’ – the so-called ‘scorched earth’ policy.
• SCORCHED EARTH POLICY

  • Initially supposed to deny food and shelter to the guerrillas.
  • Removing, and destroying food, livestock, ammunition and anything else of use to the enemy.
  • Produced thousands of displaced civilians.
  • Escorted to 'concentrated' internment camps- overcrowding, poor food supply and erratic medical care.
• CONCENTRATION CAMPS

  • Women, children and the elderly were moved to concentration camps.
  • Poor administration.
  • No proper sanitation- water-borne diseases like typhoid killed thousands as more civilians were brought in.
  • March 1901- 27 camps holding 35,000 people; by September, there were 35 camps with 110,000 people.
  • By the end of the war, 1 in 4 camp internees had died from disease.
  • Nearly 28,000 people died.
• BLUNDER OR POLICY?

  • Kitchener stated that the camps were humanitarian.
  • Critics suggest that the camp policy was deliberate neglect.
  • The army had realised that the camps had become a propaganda gift to critics abroad and anti-war campaigners at home.
• BLOCKHOUSES

  • Kitchener ordered the ‘segmenting’ of the countryside by wire and blockhouses.
  • 8,000 blockhouses and 4,000 miles of barbed wire helped the British to establish control.
• THE WAR'S END

  • A general uprising did not take place and the invading Boers were chased back into the Orange Free State.
  • Boer guerrilla groups continued to trouble the British in the Transvaal until the last skirmish of the war in April 1902.
  • The Boer leaders met Kitchener and the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed on 31 May 1902 in Pretoria.