stalin foreign policy

• attitudes 1924-29

  • aim to keep safe while prioritising building socialism in one country
  • couldn’t isolate USSR with instability in china and opportunities in germany (chicherin 1918-30 CfFA)
  • chicherin and litvinov showed a moderate diplomatic image which was essential in reassuring foreign powers in doing business with the USSR
  • comintern used in 1929 to launch attack on social democratic parties in europe that were diluting appeal of communism to working class
• china 1924-29

  • policy was linked to leadership struggle
  • chinese rev saw the overthrow of emperor
  • instability intensified after death of president 1925
  • rival groups battled for power: chinese communist party (CCP) and the nationalist Guomindang (GMD)
• china 1924-29

  • trotsky support CCP - wanted to lead a proletarian rev in china, believing another communist state would be step forward for permanent revolution
  • stalin didn’t believe CCP strong enough to take control, fearful an unstable china would threaten USSR borders
  • he backed a bourgeois rev by GMD, who had good financial backing
  • stalin urged for CCP to join GMD in its bourgeois rev, after which the CCP could start building up to proletarian rev
• china 1924-29

  • the alliance failed to happen
  • the GMD used funding and military assistance from USSR to build its army and violently suppress worker revolts and massacre CCP members
  • party congress 1927 criticised stalin for his actions in china but trotskys accusations of stalin betraying communism in china did not stick
  • = overall stalins policy to china show how far his attitude towards foreign policy was rooted in his determination to eliminate rivals and his concern for security if USSR - to him, this was more important than the spread of communism
• germany

  • after rapallo treaty in 1922, build reactions continued to build with weimar germany , the foreign ministers being committed to fostering cooperation
  • 1926 = treaty of berlin
  • aimed at building trustful cooperation between germany and USSR
  • stated that if either were attacked by another country then the other would remain neutral and that neither would join any economic boycotts organised against either of them
  • USSR benefitted economically = received large financial credits from german banks in 1926
• germany

  • when german foreign minister died in 1929, relations strained again
  • this was along with the development of the world economic crisis, hitters rise to power and stalins more aggressive foreign policy
• comintern before 1929

  • before 1929 it was of low priority to stalin as he focused on gaining party control
  • his original commitment was to developing socialism in one country and comintern was strongly associated with trotsky and his opposing theory of permanent rev
• comintern after 1929

  • stalin identified a new phase which was an all out attack on anti-communist, social democratic parties in europe
  • readied itself for new fight by: ensuring all foreign communist parties purged themselves of weak elements and imposed strict discipline on them, making sure all communist parties followed the line on policy handed down by USSR
  • soviet control over comintern tightened as stalin appointed yes men to lead
• attitude change after 1929

  • stalin more aggressive approach after 1929
  • could be a way to attack bukharin, who was opposed to new focus
  • a result of stalins confidence after removing trotsky
  • a ’stalin rev’ in foreign policy
  • connected to stalins fear of challenges from power bases in other countries
• international relations

  • after 1917: soviet russia internationally isolated as the west feared being infected by the spread of communism, wary of comintern
  • USSR feared counter revolution
  • isolation an issue for russia as they needed trade with other countries to pay for industrialisation
  • initially only germany would deal with the USSR, the 1926 ToB building on foundations of the 1922 ToR: had sig economic impacts for both and opened way for USSr to join league of nations
• industrialisation

  • rapid industrialisation depended on foreign expertise, especially from germany and USA
  • however early purges turned on foreigners
  • the USSR became fearful of an imminent invasion by capitalist countries and increased threats from japan
• cooperation with germany

  • most intensive period was 1929 to 1932
  • german expertise helped industrialisation with 70% of the foreigners working in USSR in 1930 being german
  • USSR benefited from german military training while germans benefited from access to areas in USSR where they could carry out military developments banned under versailles treaty
  • germany was USSRs biggest export market while USSR major customer of german manufacturing
  • negotiated continuation of berlin treaty 1931
• end of cooperation with germany

  • likely stalin welcomed hitters rise to power as a sign of weakness and division between capitalist countries
  • when hitler became chancellor in 1933, stalin moved away from cooperation and towards a greater emphasis on collective security
• league of nations

  • invited to join sep 1934
  • for the west, bringing the USSR in strengthened collective security against aggression from germany and japan, who had both withdrawn in 1933
  • for the USSR, this offered potential for international cooperation against the anti-communist hitler as well as giving the USSR opportunity to influence the actions of britain and france
• stalins reaction to germany

  • despite obvious threat to USSr from hitlers regime, he was slow to react
  • even when the german communist party was severely repressed by nazis
  • it’s possible stalin was hoping for germany, britain and france to weaken each other in war while a neutral USSR grew stronger
  • though he did seek alliances with countries treated by german aggression
• alliances

  • 1932: non aggression pact with poland which was made into 10 year agreement
  • 1932 non aggression pact with france formed basis of a franco-soviet pact of mutual assistance negotiated in 1934
  • 1935: mutual assistance pact with czechoslovakia said the USSR would intervene military if they were attacked by third party as long as france did the same
  • pacts not followed by any serious military planning
• comintern policy switch

  • stalins willingness to form alliances encouraged reversal in policy
  • officially announced at comintern congress 1935
  • instead of targeting democratic socialists, foreign communist parties were encouraged to form ‘popular fronts’ with socialists in order to fight fascism
• spain

  • civil war 1936 when fascist-supported nationalists aimed to overthrow socialist republic
  • stalin decided to intervene, support consisted of military equipment and advisors which was sig in helping the republic to hold off nationalist in first part of war
  • he then moved to a strategy of prolonging the war in hopes of wearing down german and italian forces fighting on nationalist side
• spain

  • stalin disappointed by weak response to civil war from france and britain in the opportunity to fight fascism in spain
  • this was a sign that they may continue to be weak against threat from nazi germany
  • soviet intervention worsened fear and dislike of soviet communism in the west, simultaneously weakening prospects of future collaboration
• western appeasement

  • F and B protested against G annexation of austria in 1938 but took no further action
  • B prime minister, chamberlain, beloved that appeasement of hitler was the best way to achieve peace
  • munich conference 1938 = G, F, B and Italy discussed how to deal with G claims to area of czechoslovakia
  • czechoslovakia and USSR excluded from conference
  • this sent clear signal to USSR that it shouldn’t expect any robust opposition from the west of stop further G aggression or for the west to join USSR in an anti-hitler alliance
• response to japan

  • 1930s - stalin concerned about japanese aggression, their military dictatorship had built up a powerful war machine
  • japans initial invasion of china in 1931 then the rest in 1937 was a sig threat to russia
  • J and G signed anti comintern pact on 1936, italy joining the following year - threatened joint action against comintern interference in their countries
  • minor border confrontations between J and USSR became major war in 1939
  • USSR defeated J in aug 1939 - J underestimated with 75% forces killed, left USSR alone after
• nazi-soviet pact aug 1939

  • agreed G and USSR would respect each others territory, increase trade and settle disputes peacefully
  • secretly divided eastern europe into G sphere of influence and soviet sphere
  • stalin still kept up a dialogue with western democracies and the continued anti-nazi propaganda campaigns
• reasons for n-s pact

  • stalins policy towards G can be viewed as inconsistent, changing from consistent to conflict
  • however, it may be seen as consistent in that he was always focused on keeping USSR safe from war
  • may have been a delaying measure from USSR as the red army weren’t ready for the inevitable invasion from G following purges and administrative confusion over rearmament
• benefits of n-s pact

  • stalin: breathing space to prep for war, the destruction of poland (anti-soviet), territorial gains in west, could stay neutral and capitalist enemies wore each other out, avoided war on two fronts (japan and germany)
  • hitler: raw materials from USSR, avoided war on two fronts (france and USSR), freehand to invade poland
• outcome of n-s pact

  • sep 1939: G invaded P, USSR invaded two weeks later, leading to destruction of P
  • hitler was free to send armies westwards without fear of soviet reprisals in east, defeated F in 1940
  • USSR seized control of baltic states in 1940
  • USSR invaded finland 1939, showed how weak the red army was following purges but an agreement was reached and finland gave up 10% of territory
• stalins mistakes with n-s pact

  • only provided temporary safety for USSR
  • he calculated that G couldn’t invade until 1942 earliest, buying plenty of time to get ready
  • however it only took G 6 weeks to defeat most of western europe and their war machine was only getting stronger and more motivated
  • stalin thought he could trust hitler, ignoring warnings from USSR extensive spy network that suggested hitler had begun preparing for invasion by oct 1940
  • therefore, when invasion came on 22 june 1941, the USSR were far from fully prepared