Philo of Language

• Thought (der Gedanke)


  Something for which the question of truth arises, including both true and false thoughts. Thoughts are the senses of sentences.

  
• Thinking (das Denken)


  The grasp of a thought
• Judging (das Urteilen)


  The acknowledgement of the truth of a thought
• Expressing a thought (einen Gedanken ausdrücken)


  Manifesting a judgment through assertion

  
• Asserting (das Behaupten)


  The manifestation of a judgment
• Frege anticipates two distinctions that have been largely accepted in subsequent philosophy of language:
• ACT / CONTENT


  The distinction between the act (e.g. judging) and the content (e.g. the thought judged)
• FORCE / CONTENT


  The distinction between the force (e.g. asserting) and the content (e.g. the thought asserted)
• Thoughts are the primary truth-bearers, not sentences
• Sentences can be said to be true or false only in a derivative or inappropriate sense
• Thoughts


  Sensibly imperceptible, belonging to a third realm distinct from the physical world and the realm of inner ideas

  
• Facts are true thoughts
• Thoughts


  • They need no owner, they are not sensibly perceptible, and they are mind-independent
• Grasping a thought


  The metaphor of "grasping" a thought is appropriate, as thoughts are already there and we take possession of them
• Thought (der Gedanke)


  Distinct from thinking (das Denken), judging (das Urteilen), and asserting (das Behaupten)
• Frege: '"Logic" 1897, p. 144/233'
• Frege: '"Logic" 1897, p. 149/237'
• Metaphor of "grasping" thought


  • Thought (der Gedanke) is already there and all we do is take possession of it
• Thought (der Gedanke)


  vs. thinking (das Denken)
• We distinguish


  • The grasp of a thought - thinking [das Denken]
  • The acknowledgement of the truth of a thought - the act of judgment
  • The manifestation of this judgment - assertion

  
• Thought


  A mind-independent entity
• Thinking


  A mental process consisting in "grasping" a thought
• Thoughts are neither products nor acts
• Thinking does not generate thoughts, nor are thoughts constituted by thinking

  
• Other philosophers have construed thoughts as products of acts of thinking or as acts
• The "mystery" of grasping a thought


  It is a mental process that takes place on the very confines of the mental and cannot be completely understood from a purely psychological standpoint
• Frege does not need to concern himself with the mental process of grasping thoughts in logic
• Why Frege introduces the thought/thinking distinction

  To vindicate three platitudes:

  1. Different people can think the same thing
  2. The same people can think the same thing on different occasions
  3. Something can be true or false even though nobody thinks or says it
• Frege's account: there is a mind-independent Gedanke that is true or false, and that we can "grasp" through acts of thinking

  
• Frege's model of thinking vs. grasping a thought

  Analogous to a person grasping a stone

  
• Frege's contrast between thought and thinking is a version of the later act/content distinction

  
• Frege distinguishes


  • Thinking (das Denken)
  • Judging (das Urteilen)
  • Expressing a thought (einen Gedanke ausdrücken)
  • Asserting (das Behaupten)

  
• Thinking and expressing a thought do not involve or manifest commitment to the truth of the thought

  
• Judging and asserting involve or manifest commitment to the truth of the thought
• The force/content distinction


  Belongs to certain mental or linguistic acts, with forceless acts (e.g. grasping or expressing a thought) and forceful acts (e.g. judging and asserting)
• Ordinary language does not have a clear sign of assertion like Frege's "judgment stroke"
• Frege uses the "judgment stroke" in his formal language to mark sentences meant to be asserted
• ⊢


  Frege's "judgment stroke" - marks the sentences that are meant to be asserted
• Sentences not prefixed by "⊢" are merely meant to express a thought without asserting it
• Grundgesetze der Arithmetik Vol 1, §5 (for an earlier and partly different account, Begriffsschrift (1879), §2)

  1893