metaethics

• absolutists


  fixed unchanging truths about right and wrong
• relativism


  morals are flexible and not absolute. Individualistic and situational.
• naturalism


  morals are part of the natural world and can be observed. Ethical naturalism doesn't allow moral dispute. Morality is still subject to change, but this doesn't make a statement wrong as it's an expression of contextual attitudes
• intuitionism


  knowledge received in a different way from science and logic
• Hume's Law


  you can't go from an 'is' (fact) to an 'ought' (moral statement)
• naturalistic fallacy


  G.E Moore's argument that it's a mistake to define moral terms with other properties
• David Hume PRO: NATURALISM

  1. empiricist- believed things can only be meaningful if proved by senses
  2. "A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence"
  3. developed ethical naturalism- we observe the world and develop theories that fit into that observation
  4. the 'is-ought' gap suggests that you can't derive a moral "ought" from a natural "is"
• What do naturalists believe?

  • you can establish moral facts by looking at evidence and understanding it.
  • moral conclusions can derive from non-moral premises (e.g senses)
  • moral facts aren't: likes/dislikes, views/opinions, based on spiritual sense
• R.B Perry PRO: NATURALISM


  1. Hedonic naturalism = goodness is a fact of pleasure/happiness
  2. 'good'= "object of favourable interest"
  3. 'right' = "being conductive to harmonious happiness"
  4. pleasure is the non-ethical element and happiness is the ethical element
• F.H Bradley KEY!

  • 'Ethical Studies (1876)'
  • Ethical Naturalist
  • morality derived from observing societal positions and self-realisation
  • rejected hedonism pleasure doesn't aid self-understanding
  • "we have found self realisation, duty and happiness in one"
  • immorality = going against societal roll
• G.E Moore KEY! - non-naturalist and intuitionist

  • 'Principia Ethica (1903)'
  • can't identify goodness with a natural quality - naturalistic fallacy (links to Hume's 'is-ought' gap)
  • ethical non-naturalist (moral statements cant be translated into natural ones)
  • good "cannot be defined"
  • intuitions are "incapable of proof" and true by nature
  • "good is good, and that is the end of the matter".
  • We can't prove an intuition, but we know intuitively what's right - weak?
  • Believes that the colour yellow can only be known through intuition. Goodness is like yellow, you can't explain it further
• H.A Pritchard

  • we know our moral obligations via intuition
  • 'Moral Writings'
  • moral dilemma = weighing up the importance of contrasting obligations
  • has a positive view of human nature, people have a duty to fulfil.
  • very subjective- no correct way of solving dilemmas
  • argued that moral obligations form immediate apprehensions, a bit like mathematics - we can see that 2+2=4 without needing further explanation
• W.D Ross

  • cant define what good/obligations are
  • intuitionist
  • Believes that prima facie duties should be followed. (Justice, gratitude, non-maleficence etc) and the rational individual knows what to do
  • Our moral intuition tells us whether an action is right/wrong
• W.D Ross PROS


  1. Vardy- Ross makes the distinction of ‘right’ and ‘good which leads to a greater understanding
  2. Situational- compared to absolute duties as some duties can be overridden by more pressing ones
  3. Values moral autonomy- our knowledge of rightness comes from personal introspection
• W.D Ross CONS


  1. Johnathan Dancy = externalism - moral beliefs can only motivate us with an external factor e.g desire, but beliefs should be motivation themselves
  2. lack of detail - claims rightness is a fact but doesn’t explain how we know it
• H.A Pritchard PROS- '...Theory of Knowledge'


  1. values moral autonomy - values personal introspection
  2. great insight to duty and our actions
  3. optimistic - human nature seen as positive with the ability to make moral decisions
• H.A Pritchard CONS


  1. Subjective- relies on intuition and introspection so would vary
  2. reductionistic- tells us that knowing our moral duty motivates us but doesn’t tell us how
  3. lack of inclusivity- doesn’t explain how those with weaker intuitions and a poor moral capacity should make ethical decisions
• G.E Moore PROS- 'Principia Ethica'


  1. accepts that intuitions might be wrong
  2. clearer understanding of ‘good‘
  3. subjective so duties can be overruled if one brings about more good
• G.E Moore CONS


  1. Doesn’t answer the problem of ethical motivation - doesn’t tell us how we move from believing that something is good to actually doing it
  2. Ethical teleologist - doesn’t consider anything but the consequences
  3. ethical subjectivist - doesn’t consider the possibility of an objective good. Believes there are no right/wrong actions
• A.J Ayer- 'Language, Truth and Logic'


  • emotivist
  • saying an action is right or wrong is “not making any factual statement” but is “expressing certain moral sentiments” - there’s no empirical judgement so is only a statement. (Boo-hurrah ethics)
  • Verification principle = statement meaningful if it can be verified analytically (true as is) or synthetically (true and can be proved by world around us), but didn’t apply to religious/moral ideas
  • Moral statements differ via strength in command, not all emotive Statements are equal
• A.J Ayer EMOTIVISM: PROS


  1. Can be linked to Hume - Moral value not amongst senses
  2. Good for human development - allows us to reflect on the meaning of our statements
  3. Allows specifics - avoids excessively metaphysical statements
• A.J Ayer EMOTIVISM: CONS


  1. Only focused on feelings - Peter Vardy called this a "non-ethical theory" as it says nothing about ethics and only feelings
  2. dismissive - states that it's impossible to contradict one another on the points of ethics. Absolutists/naturalists would argue that there are wrong actions
  3. Ignores the link between ethical statements and ethical actions e.g motivation
• C.L Stevenson- 'Ethics and Language'


  • emotivist
  • disagreements in attitudes are not just disagreements in emotion, but also underlying convictions
  • emotions are malleable and moral attitudes are more complex but still based on personal opinion
  • attitudes are based on beliefs
• James Rachels EMOTIVISM CRITIQUE

  It was wrong to remove reason from moral judgements. Opinionated statements without moral judgement need no reason but moral judgements do to avoid becoming arbitrary (e.g. "I like murder")
• Ross doesnt explain how we decide between conflicting duties
• Ross has no explanation for how we acquire these intuitions or why they are reliable
• Moral absolutism is the view that there are absolute moral truths which apply universally across all times and places
• Ethical relativism is the view that moral judgements are relative to cultures, societies or individuals.
• meta-ethical theories argue for what they claim goodness actually is.
• Meta-ethics can be contrasted with normative ethics (the attempt to work out which actions are right/wrong) and descriptive ethics (the attempt to compare and describe moral behaviours).
• David Hume - NATURALIST - 'A Treatise of Human Nature'


  • “A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence”.
  • empiricist
  • Ethical naturalists believe that it is equally possible to establish moral facts, by looking at the evidence.
  • our logic faculty are the tools that a moral person uses to conclude ethical truths.
  • Moral truths are facts
• R.B Perry - Hedonic Naturalist- 'Realms of Value'


  • Hedonic naturalists
  • see goodness as a fact of pleasure or happiness
  • ‘good’ means ‘being on object of favourable interest’ and ‘right’ means ‘being conducive to harmonious happiness’.
• Naturalism strengths

  • makes morality objective rather than subjective. Therefore, morality is universal. This gives morality importance rather than just being a matter of personal opinion.
  • Naturalism allows moral claims to be tested in a scientific way.
  • Naturalism fits with certain normative ethics like: Natural Law and Rule Utilitarianism
• Top Prima Facie Duties for W.D Ross

  • Fidelity
  • Gratitude
  • Justice
  • Beneficence
  • Self-improvement
  • Non-malificence
• Alasdair Maclntyre - emotivism critique- 'After Virtue'


  • emotivism is a misconceived theory of ethics
  • It has obscured modern life in which all judgements are an expression of opinion
  • It stops us from seeing the importance of human qualities and causes us to treat others as "always means, never ends"
• R.M Hare - emotivism critique


  • we are too complex to reduce morality to this. He was against this REDUCTIONISM
  • Emotivism is too simplistic
  • Morality involves the use of reason. He cannot accept that such terrible acts as the Holocaust can be reduced to subjective emotional statements alone
• R.M Hare - Prescriptivism


  • moral words are not descriptive and emotive in meaning; they are descriptive and imperative - "I don't like..." = "Don't do..."
  • 'The Language Of Morals'
  • Non-cognitivist theory as it describing how you feel about something is subjective depending on who you ask
  • Critic: Kiley Bense = "Languages are always evolving and changing; they do not have linear edges that separate them"
• C.L Stevenson - 'Facts and Values' - Emotivist


  • analyses emotive meaning by connecting meaning to use
  • moral words have emotive meanings, which are neither descriptive nor analytic
  • The purpose of moral judgements is not to state facts, but to influence how we behave through expressions of approval and disapproval
• Emotivism argues that ethical statements express personal feelings, not objective truths.

  • non-cognitivist = doesn't contain truths / feelings
  • A.J Ayer in 'Language, Truth, and Logic' advocated for logical positivism: the suggestion that only statements that are empirically verifiable are meaningful. So, moral statements themselves are not meaningful as you can't prove them. They have worth, but not meaning.
• • Nietzsche criticised Moore's 'yellow' analogy, and argued that one person may see good as one thing whereas one may see good as another, suggesting the issue of

  "ethical colourblindness"