the end in sight

• Neither JFK nor NK presented any significant offer as a basis for a diplomatic settlement 
• Brinkmanship was a high-risk strategy in international relations 
• Only be successful if both sides recognised that any form of military confrontation in a nuclear age would clearly be the least desirable approach 
• NK certainly began to rethink his position 
• If, as he often declared, his aim had been to protect Castro’s regime from US aggression by deploying nuclear missiles, he had clearly not succeeded
• Cuba appeared to be in the greatest danger of US invasion 
• Less well known at the time was that JFK was willing to negotiate regarding the presence of US nuclear missiles in Turkey 
• The Jupiter missiles posed the same threat to the USSR as nuclear weapons in Cuba posed to the USA, making it an appropriate bargaining chip
• 26 Oct – JFK was still keeping his options open 
• Although he hadn’t rejected the idea of compromise as he said ‘we will get the strategic missiles out of Cuba only by invading Cuba or by trading’
• Using force to overthrow Castro and remove the missiles remained an essential policy option for JFK
• Same day – NK sent a long and rambling telegraph to JFK
• NK was looking for a way out of the crisis 
• The basic proposal that NK was making was that if the USA made a non-invasion pledge, then the USSR would remove its military presence on Cuba 
• From the US point of view, this was a perfect scenario 
• The blockade was having no impact on the weapons systems already on Cuba 
• The nuclear threat was real and it was in place 
• A military solution was still a real option for JFK 
• A peaceful resolution was made more difficult at the point by Castro’s actions 
• He was convinced that an American attack was imminent
• 26 Oct – Castro ordered Cuban anti-aircraft forces to start firing on low-level reconnaissance planes
• The linkage between US missiles in Turkey and Soviet missiles in Cuba had the potential to undermine any moves towards a mutual compromise agreement 
• ExComm violently opposed the trade-off 
• News came through to ExComm that a U-2 spy plane had been shot down over Cuba and the pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, had been killed 
• JFK and ExComm had already committed themselves to responding to such attacks with US air attacks against Soviet S-75 anti-aircraft emplacements on Cuba 
• The crisis appeared to be on the brnk of escalating out of control 
• JFK’s strategy to recover was to ignore NK’s second letter and simply reply to the first
• JFK needed to ensure that NK would accept this response 
• A meeting was summoned with the Soviet ambassador, Dobrynin, during which Robert Kennedy was authorised to inform him that the president was willing to remove the US missiles in Turkey – but not immediately
• such a concession couldn’t be incorporated into any formal, public settlement of the crisis
• JFK recognised the fairness of such a trade-off but couldn’t allow the USA’s NATO allies to view it as a concession to Soviet pressure 
• So important that NATO was told explicitly that no secret agreement had been reached 
• Diplomacy was a success
• Sunday morning, 28 Oct – NK agreed to remove the missiles 
• JFK praised NK’s ‘statesmanlike decision’ 
• The immediate crisis was over
• Castro was incensed at what he saw as a humiliating betrayal by NK
• Refused to allow inspections of the missile sits once they had been dismantled 
• Such checks were an essential element of the US-Soviet agreement and were only fulfilled as Soviet ships removing the missiles revealed the contents of their cargoes to US inspectors