Plato’s answer, that knowledge is justified true belief, stood for thousands of years until a 1963 philosophy paper by philosopher Edmund Gettier challenged this definition.
Sosa’s virtue epistemology could correctly say Henry’s belief “there’s a barn” in fake barn county would not qualify as knowledge – despite being true and formed by a reliable method – because it is not apt.
Aptness provides a link between truth and the third condition that rules out Gettier-style situations where the belief is only true as a result of luck.
According to Sosa, for something to qualify as knowledge the belief must be true as a direct consequence of the believer exercising their intellectual virtues, it must be apt.
Virtues enable us to achieve our goals, in the same way a virtuous knife enables you to cut, and intellectual virtues would enable you to reliably form true beliefs.
Smith's belief that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is true because the first condition is true (i.e. that Jones owns a Ford) but it turns out it is true because of the second condition (Brown is in Barcelona).
Despite being a justified true belief, it is wrong to say that Smith's belief counts as knowledge, because it was just luck that led to him being correct.
In Gettier case 2, Smith has a justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford" and can form the further justified belief that "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" using the principle of disjunctive introduction.
In Gettier case 1, Smith hears the interviewer say "I'm going to give Jones the job" and sees Jones count 10 coins from his pocket, forming the belief that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".
The no false lemmas definition says that James has knowledge of P if: P is true, James believes that P, James’s belief is justified, and James did not infer that P from anything false.