is behaviourism the correct view of mental states?

• Intro

  • behaviourism is a physicalist theory which argues that the mind and mental states can be analytically reduced to behaviour
  • there are two types of behaviourism:
  • hard behaviourism - all propositions about mental states can be reduced without loss of meaning to propositions that exclusively use the language of physics to talk about bodily states/movements
  • soft behaviourism - propositions about mental states can be translated (without loss of meaning) into propositions about behavioural dispositions (i.e. propositions that use ordinary language) 
• first A (1)

  multiple realisability:

  • argues that the same mental state can be realised by a whole series of behaviours that cannot be listed or categorised
  • e.g. Henry believes it is going to be frosty tonight so Henry puts on a woolly jumper and starts a fire
  • it is not possible to tell which of these behaviours results from the mental state of believing it will be frosty
  • the same behavioural disposition could be a result of different mental states
• first A (2)

  multiple realisability:

  • the belief that it will be frosty tonight is not enough to motivate the behaviour Henry displays, he must also have a desire to not be cold - so Henry has a belief that links to a desire which indicates there is a causal relationship between mental states
  • this causal complexity of mental states that rely on other mental states cannot be satisfactorily explained by behaviourism
• response to issue of multiple realisability 


  • the behaviourist response to this objection is that it is a straw-man argument, behaviourists do not claim to read people's minds - the theory only claims people have behavioural dispositions, not that we can know what mental that behaviour e.g. putting on a woolly jumper is assigned to
• response to issue of multiple realisability (2)

  • Ryle also disagrees with this issue. Although he agrees that behaviours can be linked to an unending list of mental states, he disagrees that this issue is relevant for the core part of behaviourism which is that talk of mental states is really just talk of behaviours
• first E

  • this issue reveals how behaviourism can be confusing as we may never to be able to work out people's exact mental states from their behaviour
  • however, I think this issue is weakened by the behaviourist's and Ryle's response as they make apparent that this issue doesn't affect or change the view that behaviour and mental states are one and the same
  • therefore, I think that this issue is unable to challenge and disprove behaviourism although it may make it doubtable that behaviourism is not fully correct
• second A

  
  

  • behaviour is not a necessary condition for having experiences, beliefs and desires
  • if it was then paralytics would not have beliefs desires and experiences
  • if someone is completely paralysed we wouldn't say that they cease to have mental states, so it is clear that mental states cannot be reduced to behavioural states without loss of meaning
• response to issue of necessary condition

  • the soft behaviourist could argue that there is still a disposition to behave, but that the paralytic is physically unable to do so
  • the hard behaviours may respond by highlighting the occurrence of involuntary behaviours. These behaviours still demonstrate the presence of mental states
  • however these behaviours are automatic responses and tell us nothing about the cause of conscious, voluntary behaviours
• second E

  • although the response attempts to overcome the issue, it still remains that paralytics are unable to behave, even if they have the disposition to, but it does not make sense to say that they have lost their mental states or are unable to have mental states
  • this means for me, behaviour is not a necessary conditions for mental states so and they are distinct from each other
  • therefore the response fails to overcome the issue, leaving behaviourism likely to be an incorrect view of mental states
  • however this issue is not strong enough by itself to prove behaviourism to be incorrect
• third A

  asymmetry

  • it seems that behaviourism is suggesting something deeply counter-intuitive: that I can know more about the mental states of others than I can of my own
  • introspection would then be impossible and that just doesn't appear to be correct from our own experience, I do not know my mental states through experiencing my own behaviour
  • we do have self-knowledge and arguably more than we do of others
• third A (2)

  • behaviourism seems to suggest that the way I arrive at my own mental states is the same as others - through observing behaviour, but I don't need behaviour to know my mental states which shows that behaviourism is incorrect
  • if behaviourism is right in saying that we know mental states through behaviour then we should know other people's mental states just as well as we know our own, however we indisputably know our own mental states better than we know other people's
• response to the issue of asymmetry

  • it can be argued that this objection is based on our intuitions about introspection and self-knowledge. The behaviourist can respond that intuition is not a good guide to reality
  • a behaviourist may claim that we are better placed to know the mental states of others better than our own e.g. therapists
  • however a behaviourist could defend the view that we know our own mental states better but on the basis that we know our own behavioural dispositions best
• third E

  • this objection just seems intuitively wrong as it is clear that we know our own mental states better than other people but to say that is because we know our behavioural dispositions best seems wrong
  • we know our mental states better because they are ours and I would argue that we are unable to understand our mental states without behaviours e.g. a paralytic would be able to understand their mental states without behaviour
  • therefore, for me this response fails to overcome the issue, meaning that alongside the second issue, behaviourism is not the correct view of mental states