exam questions

• What is a philosophical zombie?

  A philosophical zombie are physical duplicates of (have all the same physical as) people who have qualia, they are indistinguishable from people with qualia, but philosophical zombies lack qualia. 
• Explain the problem of asymmetry

  Behaviourism argues that the mind/mental states can be analytically reduced to behaviour. 

  There is an important difference between the way I come to know about my own mental states as opposed to the mental states of others.

  To determine what mental state someone else is in I only have their behaviour to go on. I learn that Paul has a toothache because he is moaning and holding his jaw, for example. 
• Explain the problem of asymmetry

  However to discover what mental state I am in I have no need of behavioural evidence. If I have a toothache, I can tell I have a toothache because I am directly acquainted with the pain.

  However, behaviourism is unable to explain this asymmetry. It suggests that knowledge of my own mental states is arrived at in the same way as is knowledge of others’ mental states, by observation of my behaviour. 

  The fact that I don’t need to observe my behaviour in order to know what mental state I am in shows that behaviourism is false
• What is meant by folk psychology

  Folk psychology = a common-sense/untutored explanation of behaviour in terms of beliefs, desires, intentions, etc (mental states) e.g. someone not walking under a ladder as they believe it is unlucky
• Jackson’s knowledge argument


  Jackson proposes a thought experiment where there was a scientist called Mary who has been confined to a black and white room all her life and so has never seen colours. During her confinement she has learnteverything there is to know about the physical processes involved in colour vision, but she learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself (namely, what it is like to see colour). Therefore, there is more to colour vision that what is provided in a physicalist account. Therefore, physicalism is false.
• propositional knowledge


  Propositional knowledge is knowledge of facts and can be expressed in propositions. It is knowledge that such and such is the case. For example, Mary would have the propositional knowledge that there are around 6 million photoreceptive cones in the human retina for the detection of colour. 
• acquaintance knowledge


  Acquaintance knowledge is the knowledge that comes from encountering or experiencing something. For example, Mary might have acquaintance knowledge of the taste of black-eyed beans.
• Propositional knowledge


  Knowledge of facts
• Acquaintance knowledge


  Knowledge through direct experience or familiarity
• The knowledge argument equivocates on these two types of knowledge
• Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical processes involved in colour vision
• Mary learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself
• Mary knows everything there is to know about the physical processes involved in colour vision

  Propositional knowledge
• Mary learns something new when she experiences colour vision herself

  Acquaintance knowledge
• A complete physical account really does exhaust all the propositional knowledge about colour vision
• Mary knew all this before leaving the room
• On leaving the room, she has become acquainted with the phenomenal characters of colour vision, the qualia
• This new knowledge is not knowledge of new facts
• What is moral anti-realism?

  Moral anti-realism argues that there are no mind-independent moral properties/facts. 
• Moore's open question argument

  An argument that states that if a term is genuinely definable, then asking 'But is X really Y?' would be a closed question. However, if the question is open, then the term is indefinable and meta-ethical theories like naturalism (which reduce moral terms to natural properties) are incorrect.
• Definable


  A term that can be defined with a closed question (i.e. one that can be answered only with a 'yes' or 'no')
• Indefinable


  A term that cannot be defined with a closed question and requires further investigation
• Closed question


  A question that can be answered only with a 'yes' or 'no'
• Open question


  A question that requires further investigation
• Naturalism


  A meta-ethical theory that reduces moral terms to natural properties
• Moore's open question argument

  • If we can genuinely define 'good' as X, then asking 'But is X really good?' would be a closed question. However, 'is X really good?' is actually an open question, which means that 'good' is indefinable and that meta-ethical theories like naturalism are wrong.
• Difference between cognitivism and non-cognitivism

  Cognitivism is the view that moral statements express propositions and are truth-apt. e.g. sentences like killing is wrong can be true or false. 

  Non-cognitivism is the view that moral statements do not express propositions and are not truth-apt.
• Explain Mackie’s error theory

  Mackie’s error theory is a cognitivist but anti-realist theory.

  Mackie is a cognitivist about ethical language so he argues that it can be truth-apt, but he argues that all ethical language is false. All discussions of ethics rest on the mistake (or error) that they are making claims about an objective moral reality. Mackie argues that as there is no such reality - all ethical language is false. This is because ethical language aims to be objective and state facts/truths - but as it does not, it is false.
• The argument of queerness states that if moral properties exist, they are of a 'queer' sort
• Moral properties are different to any other property we could know as they apparently have a motivating quality (which no other property has)
• Mackie argues that it is absurd to think that bits of the world 'out there' motivate us
• Mackie argues that it is our needs, desires, hopes, etc that motivate us
• Mackie argues that the existence of 'queer' moral properties makes ethical language false, not meaningless
• Mackie argues that the unverifiability of natural moral properties makes ethical language false, not meaningless
• Many claim the truths of moral properties are self-evident, but Mackie argues this explains nothing