Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968, a theoretical cognitive model of how the memory system processes information
Sensory register
Receives raw sense impressions, attention passes info to short-term memory, coding is modality specific, capacity is very large, duration is very short (250 milliseconds but varies per store)
Short-term memory
Receives info from the sensory register by paying attention or from long-term memory by retrieval, keeps information by repeating maintenance rehearsal or passing to long-term memory, coding is acoustic, duration is approximately 18 seconds, capacity is seven plus or minus 2 items
Long-term memory
Very long duration, permanent memory storage, theoretically unlimited capacity, forgotten information appears to just be inaccessible, coded semantically in the form of meaning
Words at the start and end of word lists were more easily recalled (Primacy and recency effect)
Recall of a random row of a 12x12 grid flashed for 120th of a second was 75%, suggesting all the rows were stored in sensory register but a large capacity could not be written as items were forgotten too quickly
Immediate recall was worse for acoustically similar words and recall after 20minutes was worse for semantically similar words, suggesting short-termmemory is coded acoustically and long-termmemory is coded semantically
Capacity of short-term memory
Average 7 items for letters, 9 for numbers, can be improved by chunking
Duration of short-term memory
Less than 10% recall of a 3-letter trigram after 18 seconds if performing an interference task
Capacity of long-term memory
75% recall for critical details after 1 year, 45% after 5 years, potentially limitless
Duration of long-term memory
90% recall of school friends' names from photographs after 15 years, 80% after 48 years, potentially limitless
Cognitive tests of models of memory are often highly artificial, low in mundane realism, and conducted in lab environments, so findings may not generalise to day-to-day memory use
Types of long-term memory
Declarative (explicit, conscious, e.g. episodic and semantic) and non-declarative (implicit, unconscious, e.g. procedural)
Episodic memory
Memories of experiences and events, timestamped, declarative, strength influenced by emotion, associated with hippocampus and prefrontal cortex
Semantic memory
Memory of facts, meanings, and knowledge, declarative, strength from processing depth, lasts longer than episodic, not timestamped, associated with frontal cortex
Procedural memory
Unconscious memories of skills, often learned in childhood, not declarative, more resistant to amnesia, associated with motor cortex and cerebellum
Case studies of individuals with brain damage suggest semantic and episodic memory use different brain regions
Generalizing findings from idiographic case studies to explain memory in the wider population is problematic due to potential unique issues in the individual
Working memory model
Baddeley and Hitch 1974, a theoretical counter model of information processing to replace the short-term memory store in the multistore model, an active processor made of multiple stores
Central executive
Head of the working memory model, receives sense information, controls attention, filters information before passing to subsystems, limited capacity of 4 items, can only deal with one strand of information at a time
Phonological loop
Processes sound information, contains the primary acoustic store and the inner voice for subvocal repetition, capacity of 2 seconds
Visuospatial sketchpad
Processes visual and spatial information, contains the visual cache for form and colour, and the inner scribe for 3D relationships
Episodic buffer
Added to the working memory model in 2000, a general store to hold and combine information from the other subsystems and long-term memory
Performing two visual tasks or a visual and verbal task simultaneously is better when they use separate processing subsystems, suggesting the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad are separate systems
Brain injury patient KF had selective impairment to verbal short-term memory but not visual functioning, suggesting the phonologicalloop and visuospatial sketchpad are separateprocesses in separate brain regions
More activation in the prefrontal cortex when integrating spatial and verbal information, and in posterior regions when not integrating, suggesting the episodic buffer exists and is in the prefrontal cortex
Participants could recall more monosyllabic words than polysyllabic words, suggesting the capacity of the phonologicalloop is limited by the time it takes to say the words (word length effect)
The working memory model seems more accurate than the short-term memory component of the multistore model in describing how memory is used as an active processor
Memorytasks used in research often lack mundane realism and may not generalise to day-to-day memory use
The central executive concept in the working memory model needs further development, and the inclusion of the episodic buffer is part of this
It is impossible to directly observe the processes described in memory models, so inferences and assumptions must be made which could be incorrect
Interference theory of forgetting
We forget because our long-term memories become confused or disrupted by other information
Proactive interference
Old information disrupts the recall of new information, works forward in time
Retroactive interference
New information disrupts the recall of old information, works backwards in time
Similarity interference
Interference is more likely when the two pieces of information are similar due to response competition
Time sensitivity interference
Interference is less likely to occur when there is a large gap between learning and retrieval
Retrieval failure due to absence of cues
Information is in long-term memory but forgetting happens due to the lack of appropriate prompts or cues
Encoding specificity principle
Context-dependent cues (aspects of the external environment) and state-dependent cues (aspects of the internal environment) act as prompts for memory retrieval
Retroactive interference
New information disrupts old information
Proactive interference
Previously learned information disrupts the learning of new information