All mental states can be reduced to functional roles which can be multiply realised
Functionalism
Reductionism argument: Functionalists reduce mental properties/states to functional properties/states
Ontologically conservative: postulates one substance, physical substance
Inverted qualia
Two subjects have qualitatively different experiences when confronted by the same stimuli, despite being functionally equivalent
Functionalism about the qualitative aspects of seeing a colour
Is true only if it is impossible for there to be two individuals with identical functional roles, but distinct qualitative characters
If it is conceivable that P
Then it is possible that P
Functionalism cannot capture the qualitative aspect of experience
Ned Block's China Brain thought experiment
A setup that is functionally identical to a mind but is clearly not the same thing
According to functionalism, the China brain would actually be in pain, say, given the appropriate inputs (like being stabbed). But this is obviously false
Just because the example of the China brain is functionally identical to human pain, doesn't mean the China brain really is in pain
So functionalism is false. There's clearly more to mental states than their function - there is no qualia in an identical functional duplicate
A version of the knowledge argument for property dualism can be used to criticise functionalism
All the physical and functional facts would not be enough for Mary to know what it's like to see red
So, there is more to the mental state of seeing red than simply the physical and functional facts
So, functionalism is wrong – there is more to mentalstates than their function as it cannot explain qualia
Functionalism
Defines mental states as functional states within an organism
Functionalism
A response to the problems faced by behaviourism and identity theory
Functions
Should be understood within the context of the entire mind
The function of pain
Isn't simply to cause behavioural dispositions, but also to cause other mental states such as a belief that you are in pain, or a desire for the pain to stop
The knowledge argument for property dualism
Can be used to criticise functionalism
All the physical *and functional facts* would not be enough for Mary to know what it's like to see red
When Mary leaves the black and white room for the first time and sees red, she learns something new about the mental state of seeing red
Functionalism is wrong - there is more to mental states than their function as it cannot explain qualia
Functionalism
A theory in philosophy of mind that suggests mental states can be defined by their functional role, i.e., the causal relationships between inputs, outputs, and other mental states.
Criticism of functionalism
Functionalism cannot account for qualia, the subjective, phenomenal aspects of our mental states. This is because functionalism defines mental states solely by their functional roles, leaving no room for qualia.
Qualia
The subjective, phenomenal aspects of our mental states. They are the "what it's like" to have a particular mental state.
Identical functional duplicate
An example used to criticize functionalism, where two beings have the same functional roles but different qualia. This highlights the problem that functionalism cannot account for qualia.
Problem with functionalism
Functionalism cannot account for qualia, the subjective, phenomenal aspects of our mental states. This is because functionalism defines mental states solely by their functional roles, leaving no room for qualia.
Identical functional duplicate example
An example used to criticize functionalism, where two beings have the same functional roles but different qualia. This highlights the problem that functionalism cannot account for qualia.
Functional roles
The causal relationships between inputs, outputs, and other mental states. According to functionalism, mental states are defined solely by their functional roles.
Mental states
The various states of consciousness, such as beliefs, desires, perceptions, and emotions, that make up our mental lives.