Did the failures of economic policy outweigh the successes

• Introduction


  -Discuss timeframe: evidently latter part of Stalin's leadership (1945-53) and the whole of Khrushchev's leadership (1953-64)- End of WWII: it made economy more unstable and removed all progress Stalin had made with first five year plans ( spent 137.9 billion roubles on defence by 1945)- Nuclear arms race with US, Cuban Missile Crisis and Cold War facing peak- Stalin :Command economy, focus on heavy industry, worker productivity (Stakhanov),'Revolution from Above'established basic form of Soviet economy until the 1980s- Khrushchev : wanted to create agricultural collectivisation and industrial planning, wanted to repair agricultural relations, Virgin Lands SchemeLINE OF FOCUS:it can be disagreed to a large extent that the successes outweighed the failures;this period led to uneven development, 'hare-brained' schemes under Khrushchev, ignorance of local conditions with central planning reforms, lack of progress as military spending still remained high

  
• Paragraph 1 : Stalin's fourth five year plan

  POINT: Arguably the Fourth Five year Plan (1946-50) was the most successful of the plans because it successfully strengthened Soviet economic policy by focussing heavily on heavy industryEVIDENCE: 90% of the economy was invested on heavy industry and there was large increases in military spending - further living standards were able to improve by 1948 ( only 3 years after the war had ended)EXPLAIN: This demonstrates a success of the Soviet economic policies as it represents the USSR's ability to the Western world to remain stable and it also led to the development of the atomic bomb in 1949 and more generally ensured Soviet Russia was the fastest growing economy. Arguably representing the strength of communism to the western world and demonstrating the success of Stalin's command economy and central planning due to their ability to bounce back within 3 yearsCOUNTER-POINT: Light industry made up less than 12% of the budget, and there was a lack of focus on consumer goods and this therefore meant there were lower living standards in general. Further, post-war period demonstrated a decrease in agricultural production - this was largely due to the lack of manpower from the war (in 1952 grain production was still below 1940s levels) - therefore it looked as if the economy was failing as the central planning was not taking into account the actual people (were not a priority) and thus it became unorganised and unreasonable targets were setOVERALL: Fourth five year plan was successful at getting industry back up and running however it did not take into account the population and thus reflected a continuity of damaging leadership after the WWII

  
• Paragraph 2 : Khrushchev's Seven Year Plan

  POINT: Launched in 1959 -65, this plan increased investment and focus on light industry which inevitably led to the wider availability of consumer goods, thus increasing the living standards for a wide majority of the Soviet populationEVIDENCE: Consumer goods were increased by 60% and further the ownership of cars, radios and televisions increasedEXPLAIN: The increase in consumer goods demonstrated an increase in higher living standards as more wants of the population could be satisfied more easily and further demonstrated a replication of the western world at that time - therefore demonstrating a success. Further, the availability of modern technology represented progression within the Soviet Union and a move away from peasant times and these were greatly beneficial to helping promote Communism through another form of propagandaCOUNTER-POINT: The growth of production was very slow, production of consumer goods remained 5% behind and even by 1964, the USSR remained to lag behind other European nations; further Khrushchev's Sovnnarkhoz's reforms of 1957 decentralised power from Gosplan to regional planning agencies yet this destroyed the central coordination of the plan and thus ruined much of the progress already made after the warOVERALL: Helped progress Soviet technology and economy as it finally focussed on consumer goods and light industry; however much of the progress made was insignificant in comparison to USA, Khrushchev had set unrealistic targets and although it started off optimistic it became unrealistic

  
• Paragraph 3: Virgin Lands Scheme 1954-65

  POINT: Increases in agricultural investment increased the overall agricultural productions, increased fertile land and further greater food productionEVIDENCE:Soviet budget grew from under 3% to 12.8% between 1954 and 1959, new farms were created in Kazakhstan and Western Siberia, agricultural production increased by 33.5% from 1954-58, due to greater food production - farmers salaries increased by 400%EXPLAIN: Due to the increased agricultural production, there was a wider variety of produce available and thus sold at lower prices; further the increase in Soviet budget represented a decrease in military spending thus demonstrating change, new farms increased employment and thus increased living standards in the Soviet nations, the increase of farmers salaries meant there were more consumers to spend money on the increasingly abundant consumer goodsCOUNTER-POINT: The land in Kazakhstan was not suitable for the farming but more so for grazing and thus the irrigation system used to force this was very expensive, workers were not earning as much as they were promised thus subsequently decreasing the incentive for hard work, 50% of Soviet population working in agriculture yet USA with only 5%, were able to double their outputOVERALL: Failure outweighs successes - land not suitable and central planning led to the scheme becoming very unorganised and failed to meet target of overtaking USA

  
• Conclusion

  To a large extent that the failures outweigh the successes; the system of central planning meant that any plans or schemes did not take into account the locality of where the scheme would be based and the manpower behind it; it was all too generalised and too ambitious, setting targets of surpassing USA as a global powerhouse was unrealistic and thus damaged more specifically Khruschev's leadership but also limited the impact of Stalin with the economic policies of the Soviet Union