Thatcher industrial relations

• Aspect

  Industrial law reform
• Miners' strike

  To reduce the losses that the National Coal Board was making by introducing a pit closure programme
• Thatcher's governments' approach to reducing union power

  1. Avoided the mistake of incorporating all measures to restrict union power into a single Act

  2. Adopted a slow, piecemeal strategy, adopting new measures stage by stage

  3. The Employment Act of 1980 outlawed secondary picketing and increased the rights of employees who refused to join unions

  4. Government money made available to encourage unions to hold secret ballots

  5. The 1982 Employment Act restricted sympathy strikes, made a closed shop much more difficult, and entitled anyone sacked for not joining a union to a high level of compensation

  6. The Trade Union Act of 1984 required unions to hold secret ballots of their members before launching industrial action
• The number of working days lost to strikes dropped considerably under Thatcher's leadership. In 1979, over 29 million working days were lost to strikes, by 1981 this was down to 4.2 million, and by 1990 it was down to 1.9 million
• Government preparation for the miners' strike

  1. Set up a secret Whitehall committee in 1981 to stockpile coal to keep power stations running

  2. Home Secretary Leon Brittan set up a National Reporting Centre to centralise control of policing and co-ordinate intelligence

  3. Used considerable force to protect the right of miners who wanted to work, demonstrating that trade union power could not be used to defeat the government
• The miners' strike ultimately failed, with all miners returning to work by March 1985, leaving the government free to roll out its pit closure programme
• These changes merely accelerated social and economic changes which had been weakening trade unions since the 1960s
• Rather than Thatcher's industrial relations policy, it can be argued the high levels of unemployment in the 1980s were the major reason for falling strike action, as workers were less ready to strike knowing that they could be easily replaced from the large pool of unemployed people
• Thatcher's time in power was not always a time of falling strike action. In 1984-85, the number of days lost to strike action leapt up again to 27 million, on account of Britain's longest industrial dispute to date, the Miners' Strike of 1984-85
• The miners' strike was arguably defeated because the miners were not united, with the Union of Democratic Mineworkers breaking away from the National Union of Mineworkers in December 1984
• The miners' leader, Scargill, also made a number of mistakes, beginning the strike in the spring and summer when coal stocks were high, as well as refusing to hold a national ballot which alienated many mine workers, particularly in Nottinghamshire
• The Labour Party also was reluctant to support Scargill, who was seen as an extremist
• Thatcher's industrial relations policy

  Aimed to reduce trade union power by reforming industrial relations law, enabling the end of restrictive practices and to give individual workers more say within their unions
• Thatcher's approach to industrial relations reform

  1. Avoided the mistake of Edward Heath's 1971 Industrial Relations Act which incorporated all the measures to restrict union power into a single Act

  2. Adopted a slow, piecemeal strategy, adopting new measures stage by stage

  3. The Employment Act of 1980 outlawed secondary picketing and increased the rights of employees who refused to join unions

  4. Government money was made available to encourage unions to hold secret ballots

  5. The 1982 Employment Act restricted sympathy strikes, made a closed shop much more difficult, and entitled anyone sacked for not joining a union to a high level of compensation

  6. The Trade Union Act of 1984 required unions to hold secret ballots of their members before launching industrial action
• The number of working days lost to strikes dropped considerably under Thatcher's leadership
• In 1979, over 29 million working days were lost to strikes, by 1981 this was down to 4.2 million, and by 1990 it was down to 1.9 million
• Thatcher's industrial relations policy undoubtedly played a part in the reduction of strike days
• Government preparation before taking on the coal miners

  1. A secret Whitehall committee was set up to stockpile coal to keep power stations running if there was a long strike

  2. Home Secretary Leon Brittan set up a National Reporting Centre to centralise control of policing and co-ordinate intelligence

  3. When the strike began the government used considerable force to protect the right of miners who wanted to work, demonstrating that trade union power could not be used to defeat the government
• The miners' strike ultimately failed, with all miners returning to work by March 1985, leaving the government free to roll out its pit closure programme
• These changes merely accelerated social and economic changes which had been weakening trade unions since the 1960s
• As traditional manual industries declined, and white collar employment grew, some of the largest and most powerful unions were already losing members and influence
• The National Union of Mineworkers had over half a million members in 1960, by 1970 this was down to 279,000, and by 1981 170,000
• Rather than Thatcher's industrial relations policy, it can be argued the high levels of unemployment in the 1980s were the major reason for falling strike action, as workers were less ready to strike knowing that they could be easily replaced from the large pool of unemployed people
• There were 3 million unemployed by 1982
• Thatcher's time in power was not always a time of falling strike action. In 1984-85, the number of days lost to strike action leapt up again to 27 million, on account of Britain's longest industrial dispute to date, the Miners' Strike of 1984-85
• The miners' strike was arguably defeated because the miners were not united, with the Union of Democratic Mineworkers breaking away from the National Union of Mineworkers in December 1984
• The miners' leader, Scargill, also made a number of mistakes, beginning the strike in the spring and summer when coal stocks were high, as well as refusing to hold a national ballot which alienated many mine workers, particularly in Nottinghamshire
• The Labour Party also was reluctant to support Scargill, who was seen as an extremist