CHAPTER 8(MARCOS)

• Postwar republic's first two decades saw no successful presidential reelection, highlighting the ineffectiveness of presidential policies
• Economic problems, including inequality and uneven development, persisted, leading to the expansion of traditional export crops like sugar and coconut
• The cost of food staples increased, causing a decline in urban consumers' income
• Small rice farmers struggled due to underdeveloped rural infrastructure, insufficient access to credit, and inefficient agricultural services
• The country became a rice-importing country, pushing rural unemployed off the land
• Industrial growth slowed due to import substitution industrialization's limitations (ISI), promoting capital-intensive production and a limited domestic market
• The entry of unskilled, unorganized labor led to wage decreases and the formation of a new urban proletarian underclass
• Marcos's Campaign and Success


  • Marcos defeated Macapagal through elite interdependence, alliances, and funds
  • Promised a "greater nation" and commitment to fight corruption
  • Despite criticism, he gained a majority in Congress
• Marcos's Approach to Politics


  • Recognized public's need for economic stability and presidency power
  • Used public spending, executive agencies (apolitical technocrats), and army to bypass Congress
• Rural Development Strategy


  1. Launched an ambitious rural infrastructure program to increase productivity and make new land available for foreign investment (In Mindanao)

  2. Built new irrigation systems, supported technological innovations, and upgraded road systems

  3. Pumped credit into the rural economy through the state-owned Land Bank

  4. Introduced high-yielding rice varieties and upgraded rural education
• The rural strategy received a big boost when high-yielding rice varieties were introduced by the International Rice Research Institute at the University of the Philippines (UP) (Green Revolution)
• Upgraded rural education, aka "Marcos Schoolhouses"
• Marcos's Investment Incentives Act and Industrialization Policy


  1. Marcos introduced the 1967 Investment Incentives Act to encourage foreign capital participation in domestic industrial development

  2. Despite opposition from nationalist senators, the act passed due to the opportunities it created for Congress and their allies

  3. Marcos faced resistance from Congress but neutralized opponents with selective release of public funds and exercised his veto on bills limiting his revenue-raising power

  4. He deployed executive agencies established by his predecessors, including Macapagal's Program Implementation Agency (PIA) and Magsaysay's Presidential Assistant for Community Development (PACD)

  5. Marcos also deployed the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in development projects, focusing on socioeconomic issues rather than military involvement
• Marcos' first-term initiatives reflected past presidents' use of power to enrich himself, his clan, and allies
• His first term, despite being developmentalist, exhibited self-serving corruption, with increased government involvement in agriculture leading to overpriced rice and infrastructure programs benefiting construction companies owned by Marcos supporters
• Legislators representing sugar interests specifically rejected taxes on exports. As a result, indirect taxation still contributed up to three-quarters of tax revenues, and even the Omnibus Tax
• Marcos's reelection

  Led to a government deficit of over one billion pesos, forcing the currency to be float in early 1970
• The peso dropping to six to the dollar

  Caused inflation to rise rapidly
• Urban unease spread due to the fear of an economic downturn
• Social and political activism increased, with student protests on Manila's campuses increasing in frequency
• The Catholic Church's political influence grew with its anticommunist offensive of the 1950s
• The issue of Filipinization within the Church was addressed in the 1960s, with Popes John XXIII and Paul VI encouraging social justice and spiritual salvation
• Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) and the Revolution

  1. After a decade of silence, the PKP renewed organizing for "parliamentary struggle"

  2. The party recruited students at the UP and the Lyceum in Manila, who were attracted to Marxism

  3. Jose Maria Sison's Kabataang Makabayan (KM) became the most vocal and dynamic of the party's new front organizations

  4. The party's youth resisted the elders' attempts to silence them, leading to their expulsion and the "reestablishment" of the party in 1968 as the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
• The Vietnam War's unpopularity, Mao's "continuing revolution," and the rise of the New Left gave the CPP an edge over the conservative PKP
• The CPP was supported by "national democratic" organizations, the UP student council, and alliances with workers' unions and peasant organizations
• The KM and its affiliate CPP organizations argued for violence against feudalism, fascism, and imperialism
• The formation of the New People's Army (NPA) in 1969 was a result of a meeting between Sison and a dissatisfied Huk commander, Bernabe Buscayno
• The "First Quarter Storm" of 1970 saw violent clashes between Marcos and his supporters, leading to the rise of radicalism and the rise of CPP cadres
• The "FQS" swelled the ranks of the radicals and turned CPP cadres into Romantic heroes
• The period was also a time of unabashed opportunism, with Marcos's discarded allies expressing sympathy for the revolution and opening their media outlets to student radicals
• The left-wing group became a major national player due to the political opportunism of anti-Marcos elites
• Political Battles and Institutional Combat in the Philippines


  1. Congress authorized a constitutional convention to update the 1935 Commonwealth Constitution, with activists aiming to reshape power

  2. Anti-Marcos delegates planned to prevent Marcos or his immediate family members from seeking another term

  3. Public anger surged when the president suspended the writ of habeas corpus and revealed bribery of convention delegates

  4. Despite losing battles in media, legislature, and constitutional convention, Marcos had the military's support

  5. Marcos maintained good relations with local power brokers by refusing to prosecute strongmen accused of violence

  6. American business interests supported a stronger state, calling for a strengthening of presidential authority

  7. On September 23, 1972, Marcos declared a state of emergency, leading to the arrest of thousands of opponents and the disarming of private military forces
• Bipartisan support for martial law emerged in the U.S. Congress, with the New York Times calling him "the symbol and the person of strength in a nation of uncertainty"
• Marcos's dictatorship was the largest dominance of state over society in the Philippines until 1986
• The centralized state's control mechanisms, economic programs, and autonomy from class and sectoral interests were examined
• A Muslim secessionist movement and the CPP-NPA offered resistance
• The new order was accepted by the rest of society, especially among urbanites
• Marcos staged a "national referendum" to approve the new constitution in January 1973
• Marcos's Legislative Powers


  1. Marcos demanded constitutional justification for his actions and signed a decree making all subsequent executive decrees and orders "laws of the land"

  2. Later amendments made him both president and prime minister and allowed him to exercise legislative powers until martial law was lifted
• Marcos issued 1,941 presidential decrees, 1,331 letters of instruction, and 896 executive orders during martial law rule