Britain's role in WW2

• Britain supported a system, of 'collective security', which involved nations co-operating together to retain peace.
• Britain sought to use the power of the League of Nations to ensure international peace and stability.
• Britain also had a policy of appeasement, which involved negotiating and compromising with Hitler to avoid widespread bloodshed. This can be seen with the Munich Conference in 1938 and was done to protect the interests of the British Empire.
• The British believed that the TOV was too harsh, especially the war guilt clause and territorial losses. Sympathy for Germany increased with the signing of the Locarno Treaties (1925) and Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928).
• When German troops remilitarised the Rhineland, the British ambassador to the US claimed it was "no more than the Germans walking into their own backyard".
• British politicians ignored Anschluss as they accepted German speakers in Austria might want to belong to the Third Reich.
• Hitler defended the invasion of the Sudetenland on the basis of self-determination. As this was the same principle the victorious powers used when drawing up the post-war borders, Britain saw it as legitimate.
• After WW1, all of Britain's military plans and decisions were made on the basis of the 'Ten-Year Rule', which stated there wouldn't be a war for at least 10 years. Therefore, military spending was cut. This meant that when Nazi expansionism became a threat, Britain was in a weak economic condition (due to the Great Depression), meaning they couldn't afford to rearm.
• Due to Britain not possessing the land forces to prevent German aggression in Europe, Britain instead focused on the navy and airforce to defend the British mainland from an invasion.
• However, the British government needed time to build up their defences against bombing raids, as the radar network wouldn't be ready until 1939. Alexander Cadogan, who was involved in British foreign affairs, wrote in March 1938 that "we must not precipitate a conflict now - we shall be smashed".
• Chamberlain was responsible for financing Britain's rearmament programme. Therefore, he knew Britain's limitations and would suit British foreign policy accordingly.
• Britain also had few reliable Allies:

  • France was paralysed by domestic political chaos
  • Russia was ideologically incompatible (Conservative Party etc were more favourable to Nazi Germany compared to the Soviet Union)
  • the USA was dedicated to its isolation from European affairs (US President Franklin Roosevelt said in October 1937 "it is my determinate to pursue a policy of peace")
• In Britain, the memory of the 'lost generation' created a powerful anti-war sentiment, which Chamberlain heavily recognised. This highlighted the overriding desire in Britain to ensure that WW1 was 'the war to end all wars'.
• In Britain, there was a prevailing belief that if WW2 was to occur, it would be decided by air power. They especially feared the Luftwaffe, particularly after the attack on Guernica in 1937. It was estimated that an aerial attack on London would lead to 150000 casualties in the 1st week. Although this was an over exaggeration, it revealed Britain's sense of vulnerability.
• Due to the British public's fears of the Luftwaffe, the government began focusing on air defence, such as improved fighter planes like the Hurricane and Spitfire. They hoped this would be a deterrent but it meant that land forces weren't sufficiently funded.
• The British Empire was very vulnerable, meaning they wanted to reduce the number of possible opponents. The Dominions were also not willing to support another European war as seen with the 1937 Imperial Conference in which only New Zealand said they were willing to support Britain.
• The British used their policy of appeasement when dealing with Italy. Mussolini referred to the Mediterranean as 'our sea', which was a threat to Gibraltar and Malta British naval bases. Therefore, they wanted to appease Italy's demands after their attempted invasion of Abyssinia in 1935.
• British interest of Malaysia and Singapore were also at risk from the increasingly belligerent Japanese empire.
• Chamberlain personally underestimated and misunderstood Hitler's expansionist aims as he assumed he would be able to negotiate like he did with other leaders.
• Chamberlain took personal control over the Czech crisis. He met Hitler one 3 occasions, such as the Munich Conference on the 29th September 1938. At the conference, Hitler signed a piece of paper for Chamberlain which said he would agree to negotiate peacefully with Britain and France. Chamberlain came home ecstatic, saying he'd secured 'peace for our time'.
• Once Chamberlain realised that the piece of paper Hitler signed was worthless, he promised to protect Poland, even though Britain didn't have the military strength to uphold.