E4.1 meta-ethics

• Cognitivism: moral statements make claims about reality so are truth-apt (capable of being true or false)
• Emotivism: Hume, Ayer (non-cognitivist, anti-realist) - there are no moral truths and, moral judgements are simply the expression of likes/dislikes
• Error theory: (cognitivist, anti-realist) Mackie: moral values are false + not objective - they are "queer", based on feelings we project onto the world
• Fact–value distinction: logical leap between statements of fact + value judgements - no statement of fact can logically entail a moral value
• Intuitionism/ non-naturalism: Moore (cognitivist, realist) - 'good' can't be defined; judgements are based on our intuitions about what the good is, but goodness is not present in nature
• Is–ought gap: Hume: there's a difference between descriptive (what is) + prescriptive statements (what ought to be)
• Moral anti-realism: morality is not objective, moral truths do not exist
• Moral realism: morality is objective + mind-independent, moral truths exist
• Naturalism: Mill (cognitivist, realist) - 'good' is a natural property + can be empirically discovered; morals can be defined + explained in natural terms
• Naturalistic fallacy: Moore @naturalism - giving a non-natural object natural properties, e.g. physical properties like shapes/colours, or responses like pleasure/pain, pleasant/desirable
• Open question argument: Moore: questions like 'What is the good?' are open questions that can't easily be answered or reduced to non-moral terms
• prescriptivism: Hare (non-cognitivist, ant-realist) - no moral truths; moral judgements express feelings, likes/dislikes and include an element of command
• prescriptivism - Hare: no moral truths, but moral judgements are (3)...

  • action-guiding - advise for/against acts
  • evaluative - don't describe world but put value on act
  • meaningful when apply to ppl in similar situations (can be universal)
• 3 strengths of Hare's prescriptivism:

  • moral judgements are evaluative + put value on act = fill fact-value gap
  • vs emotivism, can account for moral disagreements - moral discussion can be rational
  • more emphasis on reason - choose moral principles based on rational consideration
• 3 criticisms of Hare's prescriptivism

  • universalisation doesn't work - each situation is unique
  • Foot, cognitivist: can’t separate values + facts - moral properties present in world - depend on objective feature not just emotion
  • doesn’t clearly show diff between moral and non-moral recommendations - ‘You should eat lunch’ + ‘you should not hurt others’ both have same element of command so how can we clearly put moral concerns over non-?
• Hume's Fork - knowledge is either:

  • Matters of fact: synthetic propositions, probable, known empirically
  • Relations of ideas: analytic propositions, logically true, tell us nothing new
• Ayer VP on relig + moral lang

  Relig + moral lang = meaningless → not veri in practice or principle, strongly or weakly – no empirical observation can prove them true/false
• Hume (emotivism): “Morals excite passions [...] Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of reason.”
• criticisms of emotivism(2)

  • Brand Blanshard: means anything you have positive emotions to is morally acceptable
  • Doesn’t allow for moral progress
  • E.g. slavery just as acceptable if attitudes change
  • Hare: moral claims aim to persuade others (prescriptivism)
  • Moral claims emotional reactions but not like other claims
  • ‘honesty is good’ very different to 'chocolate is good’
• 2 criticisms of emotivism

  • Brand Blanshard: means anything you have positive emotions to is morally acceptable
  • Doesn’t allow for moral progress
  • E.g. slavery just as acceptable if attitudes change
  • Hare: moral claims aim to persuade others (prescriptivism)
  • Moral claims emotional reactions but not like other claims
  • ‘honesty is good’ very diff to 'chocolate is good’
• Mackie argument from queerness against moral realism:

  P1: If realism were true, moral properties would be unlike anything else + difficult to reconcile with our understanding of natural world (no 'wrongness particles')

  P2: No concept of knowledge acquisition for morality or way to come to know realist moral facts

  P3: If P1 + P2 are true, realism is false.

  C: Therefore, realism is false
• Mackie's argument from relativity against moral realism:

  P1: there are irresolvable disagreements in moral beliefs - vary from culture, indivuidual etc

  P2: if moral disagreements are irresolvable, moral anti-realism is better answer

  C: therefor moral anti-realism is a better explanation than moral realism