Cards (27)

  • Measured flow of 84 bn m³
  • 11 countries compete for its water
  • White Nile provides 30% of flows measured at Aswan, Egypt
  • Catchment of blue Nile is small relative to white Nile but heavy monsoonal rainfall from July - September means it is the greatest contributor to lower Nile flows
  • Seasonal variation in flow = challenge to river basin planners and agriculturalists, especially as it is susceptible to major interannual and decadal fluctuation bought by El Nino and La Nina cycles
    • Drought and flood cycles
    • Problem for Ethiopia and Sudan
    • Was a problem for Egypt before building of the Aswan High Dam
  • Much of the river system in hot and arid areas where evaporation losses are high, especially in the Sudd area of Southern Sudan
    • White Nile loses up to 50% of its flow between entry to and exit from Sudd swamp so early summer water shortfalls in Egypt and Sudan (flows from Blue Nile at premonsoonal low point)
    • Egypt keen to sponsor Jonglei canal scheme to speed up flow through Sudan hence decrease evaporation losses. Began in 1979, unfinished due to declining relations between Sudan and Egypt. Being reviewed as part of later Nile Basin Initiative [NBI]
  • Large number of national borders that transverse it.
  • Egypt dependeng on Nile for 95% of tis water needs whilst other states e.g Rwanda and Ethiopia require large supplies of water to develop crop irrigation, HEP production and industrial processing in order to lift their nations and their people out of poverty
  • Demands from growing populations and development combined with climate change impacts means that of the Nile Basin countries, Burundi, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya and possibly Sudan and Tanzania, will all be potentially water scarce by 2025
    • Will also impact food security, especially in countries such as Egypt which have high levels of virtual water use due to the need to import substantial quantities of food
  • Original agreements for sharing Nile's waters were bilateral between Egypt and Sudan, agreed by Britain (their colonial masters). Acquired rights for these agreements has resulted n an unfair allocation of the Nile's waters.
  • 1929: first Nile Waters Agreement was signed which gave 48 bn m³ to Egypt and 4 bn m³ to Sudan. Only 14% to other African countries. Egypt given right of veto on any modifications in use of Nile's water in other 9 nations as the downstream nation. Was favored as agricultural asset as Egyptian run Suez Canal was vital for British Imperial ambitions. Everyone else had no say.
  • 1959: second Nile Waters Agreement signed which gave 55.5 bn m³ to Egypt and 18.5 bn m³ to Sudan. Gave all the water to these 2 countries as the rest of discharge is lost to evaporation. Increased allocation to Sudan represents increased needs of a country for irrigation. Ethiopia refused to recognise legitimacy of this agreement which was signed regardless by the British colonial powers.
  • > 300 mn people live in Nile Basin area; expected to double to 600 mn by 2030 hence placing further pressure on water supplies for agriculture and domestic use
  • 6700 km long; world's largest river; Nile Basin = 10% of African continent
  • Since 2005, 9 of 10 Nile Basin countries (with Eritrea observing) have been exploring development of NBI in partnership with key external agencies e.g the World Bank to establish a common vision
  • Two subsidiary action plans:
    • Eastern Nile Programme
    • Nile Equatorial Lakes Programme
  • In spite of the funding of many worthwhile development projects and Egypt and Sudan being involved in the NBI, so little was actually achieved
  • 2010: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda signed new water treaty with Burundi, DRC and Kenya promising to sign later
  • States all riparian countries should have equal rights to use the Nile's waters
    • Upstream countries encouraged Sudan and Egypt to sign, but it depends on the politics of the Nile as the 2 countries are significantly weaker as they don't have powerful allies
  • The Grand Renaissance Dam is a hydroelectric dam under construction on the Blue Nile in Benishangul-Gumuz region of Ethiopia.
  • Neocolonialism of China which is building all schemes and dams, especially in Ethiopia (GERD)
  • Emphasis on co-operation amongst countries in the Nile Basin
    • Arguable that Egypt and Sudan are so politically weak with other wars that they have no spare capacity to fight a Nile war
  • Possible that common vision of NBI which hopes to achieve sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable usage of and benefit from the common NBI resources and hence peace will prevail
  • 2020: Ethiopia's largest mega dam project, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will be built and process of filing its reservoir will decrease blue Nile flow by 25% so Egypt-Ethiopia wars seem more likely
  • Past decade: 3 way talks between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan to agree a management strategy including how fast and when the filing should happen
  • Blue Nile in Sudan = several years of climate-change induced drought but Sudan sees an opportunity to get HEP from Ethiopia's dam so is in the middle of the 2 protagonists in spite of water loss
  • Egypt = totally opposed to Ethiopia's intent to exercise ' hydrohegemony ' hence have been seeking support from all Arab league countries and those who chaired negotiations to build opposition to dam