CIAconcluded that the USSR would not development an atomicbomb befote mid-1953
USSRsuccessfullytested a plutonium bomb
Start of thermonuclear arms race:
January 1950 - Truman announced the US were to build a ‘super’bomb or hydrogenbomb
weapon would be based on nuclear fusion but would deliver an explosive force much greater
decision of prompted by: speed of the end of the USnuclear monopoly, Berlin Blockade, est. of People’s Republic of China, discovery of Soviet nuclear spy ring, assumption of USSRbuilding such a weapon
November 1952 - successfultesting of UShydrogenbomb
Delivering the bomb by plane:
1953 - 40% of USdefencefunds to air force
1955 - USowned the firstbomber with intercontinentalrange (B52 Stratofortress)
Strategic Air Command (SAC) became the firstUSmainnuclearstrikeforce with bombers on 24-houralert
1956 - USSRresponded with the TU20 Bear
drawbacks were that planes were relativelyslow and could be shotdown and the USSR had noaccess to airbases near USterritory
Development of rocket technology:
May 1957 - USSRsuccessfullytestedfirstICBM capable of carrying a thermonuclear warhead
USSR had success with Sputnik and Vostok I
The ‘missile gap’ 1957-1961:
USSRsuccesses of rocket technology → USfearing they had more advanced military technology
‘TsarBomba’ showed that the USSR could prod. powerful nuclear bombs but not mass producing them
USpossessed more nuclear weapons than the USSR as their own ICBMs were far more superior
CIAsatellite revealed the USSR had few bombers and operationalmissiles
USdeployedIRBMs in UK, Italy and Turkey
1958 - Eisenhowerincreasedfunding for scienceeducation and research
USSRacquisition of the atomic bomb and determination to matchUSdevelopments → made clear of a nucleardeterrence
deterrenceemerged during the Korean War: Stalin did not intervene directly, Trumanrefused to use nuclear weapons against China and the US restricted the combat zone to Korea
Massive retaliation:
USconfidence of its nuclear superiority → Eisenhower administration introduced the doctrine of massive retaliation in 1954
greaterreliance on nuclearweapons involved brinkmanship which also reduced conventional arms spending
similarpoliciesadopted by USSR (1955) and UK (1997)
criticsargue that massiveretaliation was unrelealistic as the US would only use nuclearweapons in an emergency
Flexible response and counterforce:
Kennedyrejectedmassiveretaliation as being too rigid
‘secondstrike’capability (bombers, ICBMs, submarines) developed to strikeback at Russia
1962 - counterforcestrategyintroduced which made the USSR’smilitaryinstallation to be the maintargets of futureUSnuclearstrike
USSRbased its plans on an all-outnuclearattack
Mutual assured destruction: (MAD)
failings of flexible response and gradual erosion of US nuclear superiority in early1960s led to another shift in American nuclear strategy
based on understanding that neithersuperpower could defeat the other in a nuclear war without also being destroyed
Impact of the arms race on the Cold War: (stabilising effects)
deterrenteffect of nuclear weaponspreventdirectedUS-Sovietconfrontration
presence of nuclear weapons → superpowersrespected each other’s sphere of influence and did not intervene such as Hungary in 1956
US and Sovietleaders acted responsibly (Khrushchevwithdrewoffer of help in nuclear programme from Chinese communist leader)
superpowers had to cooperate to regulate the nuclear threat such as:
removal of nuclear missiles from Cuba and Turkey (1962-1963)
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963)
Washington-Moscow ‘hotline’ (1963)
Impact of the arms race on the Cold War: (destabilising effects)
Sovietacquisition of the atomic bomb (1949) precipitated a spirallingarms race
secrecy around nuclear weapon development led to superpower fears that the other side had military superiority
nuclear weaponsencouragedsuperpowerbrinkmanship
cost of nuclear weaponsimposedhugefinancial strains on bothside
nuclearweapons did not stop other forms of superpower competition