Readings 2

• Richard Taylor taught philosophy at Brown University, Rochester University, and Union College
• In this essay, Richard Taylor argues that morality, especially good and evil, is not a transcendental but a naturalistic reality, something that originates in the fact that we are conative beings (having desires and felt needs)
• If we had no desires, no values would exist—no good and evil, which are functional terms, referring to our goals and interests
• Right and wrong emerge in social situations, as rules for behavior. They are based on common goals and interests
• The rules and practices that either promote cooperation toward meeting our desires or resolve interpersonal conflict are right rules and practices, and those rules and practices that hinder cooperation and conflict resolution are wrong ones
• Moral philosophers have often proclaimed the content of 'what ought to be' as the unique realm of ethics, declaring it a fallacy to derive any philosophy of what ought to be from what in fact is
• Richard Taylor is going to remove the distinction between 'is' and 'ought', and show that all moral distinctions, beginning with the distinction between good and evil, are based entirely on certain facts and, in particular, on facts concerning human nature
• Conative beings


  Beings having desires and wants
• Men are rational or cognitive beings, but they are also desiderative or conative beings
• The fact that men have needs, desires, and goals, and pursue ends, is more obvious than the fact that they are rational beings
• Voluntary or deliberate human activity is generally interpreted as goal-directed
• Reason appears to enter into men's purposeful activity primarily to devise the means to attain the ends, and has little to do with the ends themselves
• The basic distinction between good and evil could not even theoretically be drawn in a world devoid of all life
• If the world contained only rational, intelligent, and capable beings with no needs, purposes, or desires, the distinction between good and evil would still not arise
• The distinction between good and evil arises because men are the kind of beings they are - conative beings
• Imagine a world filled with things satisfying, lovely, and beautiful—with sunrises and sunsets, pleasing sights and sounds and fragrant odors, and with all things that beings like ourselves would find necessary and agreeable to life
• Imagine the opposite—a world that is dark and cold, filled with nauseous smells and barren of anything that would redeem such bleak aspects
• Neither world is better or worse than the other if they do not contain any sentient being
• Each world is simply a world of facts, neutral with respect to good or evil, until we suppose at least one onlooker capable of some sort of reaction to such facts
• If we add inhabitants to this world who are, like ourselves, more or less rational, intelligent, and capable of perception but who, unlike ourselves, have no needs, purposes, or desires, the distinction between good and evil still does not arise
• Machinelike beings


  Can perceive what is going on around them, distinguish between true and false, and make various inferences, but nothing matters to them, nothing makes any difference so far as their needs and purposes are concerned, because they have no needs or purposes, they do not care about anything
• A world inhabited by machinelike beings would still be a world devoid of any good or evil
• With the introduction of just one sentient being, certain things in the world do acquire the aspect of good and evil
• Good


  Things that satisfy this being's actual wants
• Bad


  Things that frustrate this being's wants
• The judgments of this solitary being concerning good and evil are as absolute as any judgment can be
• No obligation or distinction between moral right and wrong has arisen with the appearance of this single living being having wants and needs
• With the introduction of another being like ourselves, another conative being with his own feelings, wants, and interests, no new distinction between good and evil is introduced
• The distinction between good and evil remains the same for both beings - those things are good that promise fulfillment of their aims, and those that threaten the opposite are bad
• With the introduction of a multiplicity of sentient beings, the foundation for ethical notions of right and wrong and moral obligation is supplied, as the aims or purposes of such beings can conflict
• Situations can arise where the wills of two sentient beings coincide, where each needs the help of the other to attain what it wants or ward off some evil
• Such a situation can produce

  A threat to life itself
• Without life all good and evil are reduced to zero
• The wills of two purposeful beings can

  Conflict
• The wills of two purposeful beings can

  Coincide in a very significant way
• Situations where two beings need each other's help

  1. One possesses something the other requires

  2. They face a common threat that neither can overcome alone

  3. They have a common end that requires cooperation
• Possibilities arising from a multiplicity of beings

  • Conflict
  • Cooperation
• Good


  That which satisfies or fulfills felt needs and goals
• Evil


  That which frustrates felt needs and goals
• Rules


  Regular and predictable behavior