Why Johnson continued involvement

• Why Johnson supported Kennedy’s escalation:

  • patriotism and America’s national prestige
  • believed Korea and Vietnam were fights for world freedom as well as American security
  • abhorred idea of appeasement after appeasement of Hitler in 30s
  • believed in domino theory
  • found it difficult to understand foreign affairs and foreigners
• Johnson’s concerns about Vietnam:

  • knew long war would probably lose support of Congress and public
  • knew weakness of Saigon gov - said Diem must reform and fight his own war in 1961
  • knew Chinese and Soviets would benefit if america got stuck fighting independence wars in Asia
• Eisenhower had created ‘South Vietnam’ and established SEATO, Kennedy had continued to support both, so Johnson considered it question of national honour for US to continue commitment.
• Feelings of guilt and the constitutional propriety of continuing Kennedy’s policies as he finished Kennedy’s term contributed to Johnson’s determination to stand by them.
• Without a popular mandate, Johnson hesitated to abandon Kennedy’s advisors and commitment to Vietnam.
• Johnson’s retention of Kennedy men such as Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk meant no fresh ideas emerged on Vietnam.
• McNamara later lamented the administration’s lack of historical knowledge and understanding of matters such as Sino-Vietnamese rivalry. Due to McCarthysim, experts on China were sacked from the State Department because their praise of Mao’s military achievements was perceived as pro-communist.
• Johnson alarmed by military, especially air force chief Curtis LeMay who wanted to ‘bomb Vietnam back into the stone age’. However, he had inherited a war and felt duty bound as Commander-in-Chief to listen to the generals.
• As Vietnam was the only war the generals had, they wanted to continue and intensify to win.
• In response to warnings from Mike Mansfield, Johnson issues a secret memorandum in November 1963 saying ‘The president expects that all senior officers of the government will move energetically’ to assist US policy in Vietnam.
• From December 1963, Hanoi sent increasing numbers of PAVN south, greatly strengthening the VC.
• General Minh, Diem’s successor, was soon deposed.
• In 1964 it was estimated that the communists controlled around half of South Vietnam.
• When General Taylor and McNamara visited Saigon in March 1964, they found the South Vietnamese generally apathetic and unwilling to fight. New PM Khanh begged for more US aid.
• Johnson felt the war needed to be won quickly before Congress demanded American withdrawal and on 20 April, he publicly declared that America was ‘in this battle as long as South Vietnam wants our support’.