Meta ethics

• Cognitivism


  Moral statements are propositions so can be true or false.
• Non-cognitivism


  Moral statements are not propositions so are neither true nor false.
• Moral realism


  There are mind-independent moral properties/facts.
• Moral naturalism


  The morally cognitivist, ethical realist view that says mind-independent moral properties and/or facts are natural (studied by science).
• Moral non-naturalism


  The morally cognitivist, ethical realist view that says mind-independent moral properties and/or facts are not natural (not studied by science).
• Intuitionism 


  A realist, non-cognitivist theory developed by G.E. Moore which claims we can determine what is right through our moral intuitions.
• Moore's open question argument

  • Any theory which is attempting to define 'good' is saying something equivalent to 'good means X' (where X is a fact or set of facts).
  • Any such definition will always lead to an open question when asking 'is X really good?'
  • If moral naturalists are right the question should be trivial and like asking 'is good really good?'
• The naturalistic fallacy

  • Good is indefinable
  • Moral naturalists attempt to define good in natural terms.
  • Therefore moral naturalism is guilty of the naturalistic fallacy.
• Hume's fork

  • All knowledge is either a priori relations of ideas or a posteriori matters of fact.
  • Moral judgments do not fall into either category so cannot be propositions.
• Ayer's verification principle

  • A statement is meaningful if and only if it is a tautology or if it is verifiable by experience.
  • Moral statements do not meet the verification principle so are meaningless.
• Hume's argument that moral judgments are not beliefs


  P1: Moral judgments, such as it is good to help others, motivate us to act.

  P2: Beliefs and reason can never motivate us to act (The Humean theory of motivation).

  C: Therefore moral judgments cannot be beliefs.
• Hume's is-ought gap


  P1: Judgments of reason describe what is the case.

  P2: Judgments of value describe what ought to be the case.

  P3: Judgments of reason and judgments of value are therefore entirely different from one another.

  C: Therefore you cannot draw conclusions about value (oughts) based on premises about reason (is).
• Mackie's argument from relativity


  P1: There are differences in moral codes between societies.

  P2: These radical differences are accompanied by disagreements between people about moral codes.

  P3: Moral disagreements may occur because there is are objective moral values, but people's perceptions of them are distorted or because there is no objective moral values.

  C: The best explanation of moral disagreements is that there are no objective moral values.
• Mackie's argument from metaphysical queerness

  • Moral realism is committed to a belief in the existence of strange objective moral properties which generate motivation for action.
  • This is an absurd position and indicates that moral realism is wrong.
• Mackie's argument from epistemological queerness

  • Moral realists are committed to believing that we have a mysterious faculty that enables us to detect these peculiar moral properties.
  • This is an inadequate hypothesis and the much simpler explanation is that there are no objective moral properties.
• Moral anti-realism


  There are no mind-independent moral properties/facts.
• Error theory


  A cognitivist, anti-realist theory, developed by Mackie, which proposes that moral judgments make objective claims about the world, but these claims are always false.  
• Emotivism


  A non-cognitivist, anti-realist theory, developed by Ayer, which believes moral judgements are expressions of approval or disapproval. 
• Prescriptivism


  A non-cognitivist, anti-realist theory, developed by Hare, that believes moral judgements prescribe actions and encourage people to act in a certain way.
• Can moral realism account for how we use moral language?

  • Moral language is used every day in moral reasoning, persuading and moral disagreements.
  • Error theory and emotivism conclude that rational debate on ethical matters is impossible.
  • Furthermore moral judgements are not always used to influence others.
• The problem of accounting for moral progress

  • It is generally agreed that the moral codes of modern society are superior to the moral codes of the past.
  • Things such as child labour and slavery are no longer considered morally acceptable.
  • However if there are no objective moral values then we cannot account for this progress.
• Does moral anti-realism become moral nihilism?

  • Nihilism is the rejection of morality and its values.
  • Nihilists and anti-realists agree that there are no objective moral facts.
  • Nihilists simply take this a small step further to conclude that we should abandon our moral practices.