Aquinas

• this contrary to the word of the Bible, saying: "No thing shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a possible thing, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing. 
• What is Aquinas' view on omnipotence?

  It seems that God is not omnipotent, for it is impossible for God to change in any way. Therefore he does not have the power to change, and therefore he is not omnipotent.
• What is Aquinas' view on sin?

  sin is an act of some kind, but God cannot sin and therefore he is not omnipotent.
• How is Gods omnipotence difficult to describe?

  for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do ‘all things’. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent.  
• What is the first way it is possible?


  First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends further than that.
• If people were to say God is omnipotent what is the problem?

  If we were to say that God is omnipotent because he can do all things that are possible to his power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of his power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because he can do all that he is able to do. 
• What is the second way a thing can be possible?

  A thing can be said to be possible absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because he can do all things that are possible absolutely; for a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another.
• a thing is absolutely possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, such as ‘Socrates sits’; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as ‘a man is a donkey’. 
• that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.
• everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility.